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INTRODUCTION 
American law represents, in the lexicon of prominent sociologist 
and lawyer Max Weber, a bureaucratization of formal rationality in 
modern society.1 Legal decisions are driven by reliance upon abstract, 
universal, and systematized rules and laws.2 Yet, while Weber 
contemplated that this type of bureaucratization of formal rationality in 
the law engendered certain benefits, such as precision, efficiency, 
consistency, and continuity, it is also deeply depersonalizing.3 The 
ideology of the “McDonaldization of society” borrows from Weber’s 
thesis.4  
The McDonaldization of society is a popular sociological construct 
coined two decades ago.5 Instead of focusing broadly on bureaucracy, 
McDonaldization draws upon the emergent model of fast food 
consumerism as representing the dominating force of formal rationality 
in American society today.6 The icon of the McDonald’s restaurant 
chain is useful in offering a well-known social artifact to illustrate and 
exemplify a macro ideology of structural processes in a postmodern 
world. The famous fast food chain, recognized worldwide, is the 
epitome of structured and refined assembly-line procedures that serve 
multitudes of customers quickly and with consistent products. The four 
main advantages of McDonaldization are predictability, efficiency, 
calculability, and control.7 Yet the McDonaldization model leads to 
irrationalities in that the same four tenets, while affording obvious 
advantages, inexorably invite unforeseen repercussions, including 
depersonalization. This recognition is reminiscent of a sociological 
paradigm known as the law of unintended consequences. The concept 
envisages that any purposive human action yields unanticipated 
consequences because a complex social world can never be completely 
controlled. 
Together, the theoretical principals underlying McDonaldization 
and the law of unintended consequences offer interdisciplinary methods 
to study the formally rational system of the law. Legislation can be 
 
 1 FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 216–21 (H. H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & 
trans., 1946). 
 2 MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 63–64 (Max Rheinstein ed. & trans., 
Edward Shils trans., 1954). 
 3 Id. at 350–51. 
 4 GEORGE RITZER, THE MCDONALDIZATION OF SOCIETY 6, at 24–26 (6th ed. 2011) 
[hereinafter MCDONALDIZATION 6]. 
 5 See generally GEORGE RITZER, THE MCDONALDIZATION OF SOCIETY: AN INVESTIGATION 
INTO THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL LIFE (1993). 
 6 George Ritzer, The Weberian Theory of Rationalization and the McDonaldization of 
Contemporary Society, in ILLUMINATING SOCIAL LIFE: CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY THEORY 
REVISITED 41, 45 (Peter Kivisto ed., 4th ed. 2008) [hereinafter Weberian Theory]. 
 7 MCDONALDIZATION 6, supra note 4, at 14. 
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properly analyzed as collective purposive action meant to achieve 
expected outcomes. Notwithstanding such intent, as the prominent legal 
scholar Cass Sunstein submits, “government regulation that is amply 
justified in principle may go terribly wrong in practice.”8 
This Article is essentially a case study in which the doctrines of 
McDonaldization and the law of unintended consequences provide a 
salutary framework for analyzing a particular area of law. The legal 
subject of this study is federal sentencing reforms. In the federal 
criminal justice system, district judges are the terminal deciders of the 
definitive sentences issued in individual cases. As thousands of district 
judges around the country determine sentences, however, consistency is 
uncertain. In the 1980s, critics charged that the judiciary retained too 
much discretion and that the result was unwarranted disparities in 
sentencing, even potential racial discrimination.9 Convinced that 
changes were warranted, Congress enacted certain legal reforms with 
the intent of achieving greater uniformity. These reforms principally 
operated by limiting judicial discretion in meting out punishments to 
convicted offenders. Today, in place of discretion is a systemized 
process of specific and uniform guidelines that direct sentencing 
outcomes through a series of computations based on discrete 
quantifications of harm. We now have almost thirty years of experience 
with these sentencing reforms. The principles of McDonaldization and 
its corollary of the law of unintended consequences appear well suited to 
examine and explain the reforms’ impact on federal sentencing. 
This Article argues the plethora of controls instituted to closely 
direct sentencing processes and restrain judicial discretion represents a 
commodification of punishments in which the products—i.e., 
sentences—are meticulously constructed through a sort of assembly-line 
justice. The products are sequentially created by Congress, a sentencing 
commission, prosecutors, probation officers, and then handed to judges 
for the final touches. Hence, I use the rhetorical moniker of 
“McSentencing” to represent the mechanized system that federal 
sentencing reforms appear designed to achieve. As this Article will 
outline, McSentencing most assuredly will confront the law of 
unintended consequences. Founded upon expectations that an 
automated style of sentencing outcomes would lead to an idealized 
uniformity, the reforms have unfortunately led to a sentencing system 
recently described by a Department of Justice official as “continu[ing] to 
 
 8 Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 
1390, 1390 (1994). 
 9 Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 227–28 (1993). 
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fragment” and besought with “visible, widespread, and unwarranted 
sentencing disparities.”10 The federal sentencing system is in crisis. 
In sum, this Article represents an interdisciplinary study of federal 
sentencing law and policy. The results are a reminder that the law is not 
an isolated entity; it operates within a social world that reacts to, and 
may fundamentally affect, any statute’s expected goals. The analysis will 
proceed as follows. Part I briefly outlines the core principles of the 
concept of McDonaldization. Part II next applies the McDonaldization 
attributes to the federal sentencing system as envisioned by legislative 
reforms to justify the label McSentencing. Part III proceeds to elaborate 
upon the unintended consequences resulting from the McSentencing 
reforms and discusses how well the expected goals of uniformity and 
proportionality have been achieved. The theme therein advances that 
the system has gone awry and, despite whatever good intentions the 
reformers embraced, unexpected aftereffects have biased the results. 
Throughout the Article, statistical measures derived from various 
government datasets supplement the analysis with relevant empirical 
perspectives. 
I.     THE PRINCIPAL ATTRIBUTES OF MCDONALDIZATION 
The McDonaldization of society is a phenomenon involving 
rationalization, commodification, homogenization, and domination.11 It 
is essentially a creature of modern society in which the personal and 
individual have been overtaken by the political and collective. Based on 
the principles of mass production and mass consumption, 
McDonaldization has far reaching application in offering a unique 
theoretical approach to studying a business, institution, process, or 
policy. Four core dimensions of the McDonaldization model, and what 
makes it so intellectually and practically appealing, are its predictability, 
efficiency, calculability, and controllability.12 
The tenet of predictability mandates that products and services are 
the same over time and in different places.13 Customers expect that Egg 
McMuffins, for instance, will look and taste the same from year-to-year, 
no matter the locale.14 Customers rely on employees of McDonald’s to 
 
 10 Federal Sentencing Options after Booker: Hearing Before the U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 6–7 
(2012) (statement of Matthew Axelrod, Ass’t Deputy Att’y Gen.), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_Meetings/
20120215-16/Agenda_16.htm. 
 11 See generally RITZER, supra note 5. 
 12 MCDONALDIZATION 6, supra note 4, at 14–16. 
 13 Weberian Theory, supra note 6, at 50. 
 14  MCDONALDIZATION 6, supra note 4, at 15. 
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interact in predictable ways, and vice versa.15 Predictability can be 
comforting, and its homogenizing effect also fits well with the second 
tenet of McDonaldization, which highlights efficient processes. 
Efficiency concerns the optimum means to an end.16 Employees of 
McDonald’s learn efficacious methods for producing prodigious 
amounts of food through very refined, assembly-line procedures.17 In 
the world of fast food, customers are processed quickly and effectively 
through methods designed to prey on impulses to expediently assuage 
hunger. Food ordering and delivery are optimized to move as many 
customers through the stores as quickly as possible. In time, officials at 
McDonald’s exploited another avenue to further improve efficiency. 
The chain promoted the drive-thru, convincing customers they could 
obtain their food more quickly while simultaneously minimizing 
physical effort.18 In some sense, the McDonald’s accelerated 
“experience” itself is commodified. 
Both predictability and efficiency interrelate smartly with the fast 
food model of mass consumption. The dimension of calculability means 
that quantity is exalted over quality, though in some sense quality is 
presumed by mass quantities.19 As a prime example, for many years 
McDonald’s restaurants would boldly advertise on large signs posted 
outside the legion of customers served.20 The company clearly invoked 
quantification as a value in this, with the numbers over time rising from 
the thousands, to millions, and eventually to billions (i.e., “over 99 
billion sold”). Calculability matters, as well, to employee performance 
metrics. Because products and services are expected to be predictable 
and efficiently delivered, workers are discouraged from creativity and 
judged primarily on quantitative measures.21 
The fourth element to the McDonaldization model is control. The 
goal of the fast food model is to process numerous customers quickly. 
The model’s main method for achieving this goal is to precisely control 
people, processes, and goods.22 The idea is to compel everyone to follow 
the same precise rules and procedures. But in McDonaldization, 
humans, with all their faults and creative impulses (which may impede 
predictability, efficiency, and calculability), become expendable.23 
Eventually, the preferred way of wresting control is to remove people 
 
 15 Id. at 15–16. 
 16 Weberian Theory, supra note 6, at 47. 
 17 MCDONALDIZATION 6, supra note 4, at 14. 
 18 Id. The food chain also benefited as the drive-thru saves it time, energy, and space from 
not having to handle those customers indoors. Id. at 16. 
 19 Weberian Theory, supra note 6, at 49. 
 20 McDonald’s, LOGOPEDIA, http://logos.wikia.com/wiki/McDonald%27s (last visited June 
7, 2014). 
 21 MCDONALDIZATION 6, supra note 4, at 15. 
 22 Id. at 16. 
 23 Id. at 18. 
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from the production equation by using non-human devices and 
technologies.24 
These four dimensions may appear simply to comprise basic 
building blocks of automation. Still, they also provide a philosophical 
perspective for conceptualizing a theoretically rational system in 
contemporary westernized culture.25 The academic who envisioned the 
McDonaldization of society concept, George Ritzer, borrowed here 
from Max Weber’s theory of rationality. Weber had expressed the idea 
that modern Western society was prone to rationalization through 
domination by bureaucratic processes.26 Importantly, both Weber and 
Ritzer recognized significant flaws with modern rational structures. 
Weber called it the iron cage of rationality, while Ritzer termed it the 
irrationality of rationality.27 For our purposes here, consider them 
analogous doctrines. This represents the fifth dimension of 
McDonaldization, though it is a consequence of, and in opposition to, 
the first four.28 At its core, the doctrine involves a realization that 
“rational systems inevitably spawn a series of irrationalities that serve to 
limit, ultimately compromise, and perhaps even defeat, their 
rationality.”29 In simple terms, otherwise rational systems become 
unreasonable.30 The same core principles that represent positive 
attributes of bureaucratization in the McDonaldization model—
predictability, efficiency, calculability, and control—are also oppressive. 
“[T]hey serve to deny the basic humanity, the human reason, of the 
people who work within or are served by them. Rational systems are 
dehumanizing systems. Although in other contexts rationality and 
reason are often used interchangeably, here they are employed to mean 
antithetical phenomena.”31 In other words, the model is paradoxical in 
that its benefits beget undesired outcomes. 
Ritzer first applied this theory to the McDonald’s brand as 
representative of a globalized and well-recognized fast food model of 
consumerism. The McDonald’s chain was merely a signifier or—again 
to borrow from Max Weber—an ideal type of institutionalization and 
bureaucratization in modern society. Ritzer observed that similar 
processes of formal rationality were represented in a host of other 
modern businesses, such as furniture sales, oil changes, tax preparation, 
and weight loss centers, with exemplary companies such as Ikea, Jiffy 
 
 24 Weberian Theory, supra note 6, at 52. 
 25 George Ritzer, An Introduction to McDonaldization, in MCDONALDIZATION: THE 
READER 4, 18 (George Ritzer ed., 3d ed. 2010) [hereinafter Introduction]. 
 26 MCDONALDIZATION 6, supra note 4, at 24–25. 
 27 Id. at 16–17. 
 28 Introduction, supra note 25, at 18. 
 29 Weberian Theory, supra note 6, at 52. 
 30 Id. at 55. 
 31 Id. at 53. 
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Lube, H&R Block, and Nutrisystem, respectively.32 Much of what 
McDonaldization has to offer for academic studies is appealing in 
realms outside of consumerism, including the law. Researchers have 
applied the concepts to legal institutions such as the British police 
service33 and to procedural mechanisms in the law such as plea 
bargains,34 probation services,35 and asylum hearings.36 The 
McDonaldization concept has also been useful in studying legal policies, 
such as drug policy,37 and the new penology of three-strikes laws.38 In 
sum, the ideology underlying McDonaldization has proven constructive 
as an alternative theoretical approach to critical analysis of a variety of 
social and legal bureaucracies, processes, policies, and laws. It offers an 
appealing perspective for a system of standardized and routinized 
outcomes in the law, hence explaining the study of the McDonaldization 
of federal sentencing that follows. The next Part addresses the question 
whether McSentencing is an appropriate nickname for the federal 
sentencing system today. 
II.     THE MCSENTENCING ASPECTS OF FEDERAL PUNISHMENTS 
The federal system of punishment traditionally represented an 
indeterminate system in which federal judges were the principal agents 
of social control with broad discretion to determine sentences in 
individual cases.39 Federal judges were, as a general rule, merely 
constrained by statutory maximum penalties. A collateral authority was 
instituted in 1910 when an independent parole agency was first 
introduced in the federal system.40 While judges still maintained 
 
 32 Id. at 47. 
 33 See generally Richard Heslop, The British Police Service: Professionalisation or 
“McDonaldization”?, 13 INT’L J. POLICE SCI. & MGMT. 312 (2011) (suggesting the activities of 
the British Police were “McPolicing”). 
 34 Deirdre M. Bowen, Calling Your Bluff: How Prosecutors and Defense Attorneys Adapt 
Plea Bargaining Strategies to Increased Formalization, 26 JUST. Q. 2, 5 (2009). 
 35 Mark Oldfield, Talking Quality, Meaning Control: McDonalds, the Market and the 
Probation Service, 41 PROBATION J. 186, 187 (1994). 
 36 Frank M. Walsh & Edward M. Walsh, Effective Processing or Assembly-Line Justice? The 
Use of Teleconferencing in Asylum Removal Hearings, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 259 (2008); see also 
Mark S. Umbreit, Avoiding the Marginalization and “McDonaldization” of Victim-Offender 
Mediation: A Case Study in Moving Toward the Mainstream, in RESTORATIVE JUVENILE 
JUSTICE: REPAIRING THE HARM OF YOUTH CRIME 213 (Gordon Bazemore & Lode Walgrave 
eds., 1999) (applying McDonaldization to victim-offender mediation). 
 37 Uwe E. Kemmesies, What Do Hamburgers and Drug Care Have in Common: Some 
Unorthodox Remarks on the McDonaldization and Rationality of Drug Care, 33 J. DRUG ISSUES 
689, 694 (2002). 
 38 David Shichor, Three Strikes as a Public Policy: The Convergence of the New Penology and 
the McDonaldization of Punishment, 43 CRIME & DELINQ. 470, 476 (1997). 
 39 Stith & Koh, supra note 9, at 225. 
 40 Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 387, § 2, 36 Stat. 819, 819. 
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dominion over the type and length of the sentences issued, parole 
officials controlled if and when prisoners would be released early 
(subject to certain legislative restrictions).41 
The indeterminate system was justified at the time considering the 
correctional philosophy for the federal prison system then relied upon 
rehabilitation.42 A rehabilitative model befittingly necessitates an 
assessment of the individual offender, his experiences, capabilities, and 
recidivism risk.43 By the 1970s, however, critics were crying foul. 
Complainants alleged that the indeterminate structure led to 
unappealing results, such as too lenient sentences for certain offenses, 
disparities in sentences among similarly-situated offenders, 
discrimination against minority defendants, and uncertainty in parole 
decisions.44 One of the primary instigators of reform condemned the 
federal system as constituting lawlessness in sentencing.45 These 
complaints eventually resonated with congressmen, and legislative 
sentencing reforms were born. 
Three types of reform legislation were subsequently passed. First, 
Congress heavily delved into the practice of assigning mandatory 
minimum sentences to certain offenses.46 A more dramatic reform 
specified a mandatory system of guidelines that was meant to 
systematize sentencing outcomes principally by restraining judicial 
discretion. Qualifying as a cardinal piece of legislation and aptly titled, 
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 created a guidelines system to be 
engineered under the auspices of the newly created United States 
Sentencing Commission (the Commission or the Sentencing 
Commission).47 Third, Congress passed a truth-in-sentencing statute to 
prospectively abolish parole.48 In effect, while the correctional model of 
rehabilitation as a principal purpose of sentencing has never been 
entirely abdicated (at least officially) in the federal system, the mood of 
Congress and the country to discount the rehabilitative model took 
 
 41 Stith & Koh, supra note 9, at 226. 
 42 Frank O. Bowman, III, Fear of Law: Thoughts on Fear of Judging and the State of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 299, 304 (2000) (“[T]he system assumed that 
judges, expert in law and the social sciences and seasoned by the experience of sentencing many 
defendants, would choose penalties that maximized the rehabilitative chances of offenders.”); 
Stith & Koh, supra note 9, at 227. 
 43 Ely Aharonson, Determinate Sentencing and American Exceptionalism: The 
Underpinnings and Effects of Cross-National Differences in the Regulation of Sentencing 
Discretion, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 165 (2013). 
 44 Stith & Koh, supra note 9, at 227. 
 45 MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 5 (1972). 
 46 Stith & Koh, supra note 9, at 259. 
 47 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 211–300, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987–
2040. 
 48 18 U.S.C. § 3624 (2012). 
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hold. The transition has been described as a seismic shift away from 
individualized justice toward aggregated sentencing.49 
Despite the guidelines initially being essentially mandatory, the 
United States Supreme Court rendered them advisory in nature in the 
2005 seminal case of United States v. Booker.50 The Court ruled in 
Booker that the federal determinative sentencing system operated in an 
unconstitutional manner.51 The mandatory guidelines system violated 
defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights to a jury trial by requiring judges, 
rather than juries, to make determinations of fact that would enhance 
the possible punishment for defendants’ crimes.52 For example, the 
guidelines increased the potential sentence if the judge determined that 
the defendant committed the offense with a hate crime motive.53 
Bestowing advisory status was the Supreme Court’s remedial fix for the 
constitutional violation.54 Yet the Booker fix did not return to the 
judiciary the ample flexibility that existed pre-guidelines. In a series of 
cases since then, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed that federal judges 
in deciding fair sentences are significantly circumscribed by the 
Commission’s guidelines and policies, albeit guided by certain other 
statutory sentencing factors.55 These factors include: the nature and 
circumstances of the offense; the history and characteristics of the 
defendant; the need for the sentence imposed considering the 
seriousness of the offense, retribution, deterrence, protecting the public, 
and the defendant’s rehabilitative needs; the range set by the sentencing 
guidelines and Commission policy statements; and the need to avoid 
unwarranted sentencing disparities among similarly-situated 
offenders.56 The Court has reiterated, therefore, that because of the Sixth 
Amendment issue, the guidelines remain important; they just do not 
constitute the only factor in considering just punishment.57 
Based on Booker and its progeny, the current process of selecting a 
particular punishment generally entails a series of steps. The first few 
involve the calculation of what the guidelines refer to as levels, which are 
essentially points. Higher levels correspond to longer sentences. The 
sentencing judge starts with the base offense level from the applicable 
offense guideline.58 She then makes appropriate adjustments provided 
by relevant guidelines to reach a final offense level. These adjustments 
 
 49 Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 
U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 902 (1991). 
 50 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 51 Id. at 245. 
 52 Id. 
 53 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.1 (2012). 
 54 Booker, 543 U.S. at 268. 
 55 Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2079–80 (2013). 
 56 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012). 
 57 Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 101 (2007). 
 58 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007). 
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generally include facts related to the offense (which are called specific 
offense characteristics), the victim, or the offender that the Commission 
perceives as aggravating or mitigating culpability.59 The total number of 
levels, together with a criminal history score, is translated through a 
solitary guidelines grid into a sentencing range (such as twenty-four to 
thirty months). This constitutes the recommended range of 
punishment. Still, the guidelines provide justifiable reasons to depart 
from the recommendation. The judge is to consider if any of the general 
departure standards apply, such as substantial assistance to authorities60 
or diminished capacity,61 for which the judge may deviate from the 
recommended range. Thus, the guidelines provide a definitive 
framework for any sentencing decision.62 Still, the Booker decision 
permits sentencing judges to vary from the guidelines’ 
recommendations, subject to statutory minimums and maximums, after 
considering the statutory sentencing factors mentioned earlier. 
This Article envisions that the federal criminal justice model, as 
framed by the reform legislation, is akin to “McSentencing.” This title 
entails mass sentencing on a scale that aggrandizes generic sentencing 
procedures while downgrading the values of individuality, creativity, 
and even humanization. To justify this moniker, it is necessary to 
discuss each of the four tenets of McDonaldization and apply them to 
the federal sentencing reforms. 
A.     Predictability 
The federal sentencing reforms were manifestly architected to 
promote the predictability of punishments.63 As a general rule, 
determinate sentencing is certainly an inherently more prophetic type of 
sentencing structure.64 Mandatory minimums, for instance, represent a 
predictable component of federal sentencing reforms, at least with 
respect to dictating sentencing floors for those committing the same 
offense. Congress has increasingly embraced the practice of mandatory 
minimum laws since the 1980s; a recent count of mandatory minimum 
 
 59 Specific offense characteristics for the child pornography guideline, for example, include 
the number of images possessed, the nature of the content of the images, the young age of the 
children depicted, and distribution activity. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2 
(2012). 
 60 Id. at § 5K1.1. 
 61 Id. at § 5K2.13. 
 62 Gall, 552 U.S. at 49. 
 63 28 U.S.C. § 994(f) (2012) (commanding Commission formulate guidelines that promote 
certainty in sentencing). 
 64 Robert M. Bohm, “McJustice”: On the McDonaldization of Criminal Justice, 23 JUST. Q. 
127, 137–38 (2006). 
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penalty provisions in federal criminal law totaled almost 200.65 The 
Commission generally has built considerations of mandatory 
minimums into the sentencing guidelines, thereby magnifying the 
combination in terms of achieving standardization and increasing the 
expected severity of sentences, which it argues is consistent with 
congressional intent in enacting requisite minimums.66 
The reform’s truth-in-sentencing measure to abrogate parole 
works on another aspect of prediction: the certainty of the length of the 
prison term actually served. Before the guidelines system, prisoners 
customarily served between forty to seventy percent of their prison 
sentences before being paroled.67 The variability—i.e., the 
unpredictability—of how long the offender could be imprisoned was 
due to the dynamic aspect of periodic assessments of recidivism risk and 
the subjectivity of individual parole decisions.68 After statutory reforms, 
a federal defendant must now generally serve the length of the prison 
sentence issued less a maximum fifteen percent reduction for good 
behavior.69 Hence, the time actually served is far more objectively 
derived and foreseeable post-reform from the perspective of those 
within the criminal justice system (Congress, judges, prosecutors, 
defense counsel, prison officials, and defendants themselves), as well as 
to external factions (victims and the public in general). 
Despite Booker, the guidelines, and the predictability they envision, 
remain the ballast of sentencing decisions. As the Supreme Court 
recently postulated, the federal sentencing guidelines constitute “a 
system under which a set of inputs specific to a given case (the particular 
characteristics of the offense and offender) yield[s] a predetermined 
output (a range of months within which the defendant could be 
sentenced).”70 The guidelines, therefore, provide an estimable anchor 
 
 65 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM 
PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL SYSTEM app. A (2011), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/Mandatory_
Minimum_Penalties/20111031_RtC_Mandatory_Minimum.cfm. 
 66 Rachel E. Barkow, Sentencing Guidelines at the Crossroads of Politics and Expertise, 160 
U. PA. L. REV. 1599, 1615–16 (2012). The institution reports that its general, though not 
universal, method of incorporation is to set guidelines ranges “slightly above” applicable 
mandatory minimums. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY 
MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL SYSTEM, at 53. 
 67 Paul J. Hofer & Courtney Semisch, Examining Changes in Federal Sentence Severity: 
1980–1998, 12 FED. SENT’G REP. 12, 13 (1999). 
 68 Peter B. Hoffman & Patricia L. Hardyman, Crime Seriousness Scales: Public Perception 
and Feedback to Criminal Justice Policymakers, 14 J. CRIM. JUST. 413, 414 (1986) (indicating 
parole decisions were based on a grid with inputs representing expected length of sentence 
served considering the severity of the offense and recidivism risk, which could be disregarded 
for good cause). 
 69 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A (2012). 
 70 Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2079 (2013). 
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for sentencing decisions.71 The Supreme Court continues to underscore 
this point, variously referring to the guidelines as the starting point and 
initial benchmark,72 remaining a meaningful benchmark through 
appellate review, and, in an eccentric gesture, recently characterized the 
guidelines as “the lodestone of [federal] sentencing.”73 
Predictability in McDonaldization also signals uniformity. A main 
purpose of the guidelines system is uniformity, which, as posited by 
Congress and the Commission, is in direct contrast to both disparity 
and judicial discretion.74 Thus, with the reforms, reducing judicial 
discretion is the primary means to achieve the expected ends—i.e., 
uniformity and proportionality in sentencing practices.75 
Foreseeability is likewise applicable to the expectations of 
customers. “Customers” is used very loosely here in McSentencing to 
encompass the individual defendants themselves as the most direct 
recipients of sentencing outputs.76 Importantly, this tenet nicely invokes 
the values of deterrence theory. Deterrence is a major penological policy 
that promotes a punishment sufficient to deter a rational individual 
from committing the crime. Before committing an offense, the 
guidelines on their face provide individuals the ability to calculate their 
likely punishments. Plus, the truth-in-sentencing law provides more 
certainty in the expectation that they will be required to serve virtually 
all of it. From a purely rational thinking perspective, the guidelines 
theoretically operate as a deterrent at least to the extent the 
recommended punishment actually is adequate to inhibit the potential 
offender from undertaking the offending behavior. Thus, the 
foreseeability of the constricted sentencing range and certainty of 
serving much of it seem to suitably fit deterrence theory.77 
 
 71 Id. at 2083. 
 72 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007). 
 73 Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2084. A lodestone represents a “magnetite possessing polarity” or, 
more simply, “something that strongly attracts.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE 
DICTIONARY 731 (11th ed. 2004). 
 74 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2012) (“The purposes of the United States Sentencing 
Commission are to . . . provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, 
avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have 
been found guilty of similar criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit 
individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into 
account in the establishment of general sentencing practices . . . .”); Mark Osler, The Promise of 
Trailing-Edge Sentencing Guidelines to Resolve the Conflict Between Uniformity and Judicial 
Discretion, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 203, 205–06 (2012). 
 75 Osler, supra note 74, at 205–06. 
 76 Wes R. Porter, The Pendulum in Federal Sentencing Can Also Swing Toward 
Predictability: A Renewed Role for Binding Plea Agreements Post-Booker, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 469, 482 (2011). 
 77 While the guidelines in operation are consistent with the goal of deterrence, it must be 
mentioned here that this is merely a theoretical exercise. Experience has proven that it is 
impractical for fledgling deviants to navigate the complex guidelines in order to correctly derive 
potential punishments. Alschuler, supra note 49, at 915 (“No one expects potential offenders to 
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Another relevant characteristic of predictability presented by the 
reforms collectively is the expected impact on the federal prison 
population. Prisons require fixed infrastructures, sufficient bed spaces, 
proportional numbers of trained staff, and commensurate other 
resources to effectively punish, protect the public, and fulfill prisoners’ 
basic human needs. Imprisonment is an enormously costly exercise and 
a notable burden on government coffers. Thus, criminal justice officials 
are often cognizant of capacity issues when crafting their sentencing 
policies.78 It was not surprising, then, that Congress contemplated that 
the Commission should consider repercussions to federal prisons when 
promulgating guidelines and policies.79 The legislature directed the 
Commission to “minimize the likelihood” that the federal prison 
population would exceed capacity.80 Presumably, the standardization 
that the guidelines were intended to provide and the Commission’s 
ongoing study of sentencing practices and prison capacity issues permit 
the agency to make appropriate modifications to fulfill this mandate.81 
B.     Calculability 
The premise of calculability is about the value of quantification.82 
The guidelines certainly qualify for this attribute, as they are inherently 
number-laden. The end result of the guidelines’ calculations in any case 
is a numeric range, which is tightly ascribed with a legislative limitation 
that the top and bottom of any guidelines range not exceed a twenty-five 
percent differential.83 The output—i.e., the range—is obtained from a 
single numerical grid. The description that follows replicates the 
summary series of steps in determining a sentence that was previously 
mentioned, yet here it fleshes out these steps to better emphasize the 
aspect of calculability in McSentencing. 
 
study the grid.”). Moreover, there is scant evidence that the vast majority of offenders actually 
engage in the rational thinking process that deterrence theory inherently assumes, which is to 
engage in a pre-conduct cognitive exercise of weighing potential costs and benefits of engaging 
in crime. Willem De Haan & Jaco Vos, A Crying Shame: The Over-Rationalized Conception of 
Man in the Rational Choice Perspective, 7 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 29, 50–51 (2003). 
Further, to the extent that many believe that the guidelines are actually based on a retributive 
philosophy—despite the Commission having never clearly enunciated which sentencing policy 
drives the guidelines generally—deterrence is irrelevant. Retribution as a theory is uninterested 
in such utilitarian concerns. 
 78 Thomas B. Marvell, Sentencing Guidelines and Prison Population Growth, 85 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 696, 700 (1995). 
 79 See 18 U.S.C. § 3551; 28 U.S.C. § 994(g).  
 80 28 U.S.C. § 994(g). 
 81 But see infra Part III.C.1. (contending the Commission generally declines to adjust the 
guidelines to manage prison growth). 
 82 Weberian Theory, supra note 6, at 49. 
 83 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2). 
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The horizontal axis of the grid addresses criminal history. The 
criminal history score itself is computed through an aggregation of 
points assigned to the defendant’s prior sentencing experiences.84 The 
guidelines assign one of six ordinal categories to exemplify the 
defendant’s criminal history score.85 The vertical axis of the sentencing 
grid represents the final offense level. It is a number between one and 
forty-three that is a terminal count from a series of sub-calculations. The 
maximum of forty-three is a residual category inclusive of totals of 
forty-three and above. The grid, therefore, has 258 cells.86 The aim of the 
machinations that are described next is to ascertain which cell, and 
thereby the tight numeric range within that cell, controls the case at 
hand. 
Placement of the defendant on the vertical axis requires an initial 
decision on which offense guidelines to apply,87 such as the one for 
robbery, drug trafficking, or money laundering. This in itself can often 
be a challenging exercise because in many cases various offense 
guidelines appear relevant, particularly if there were multiple counts of 
conviction. The general rule is that the offense guidelines producing the 
highest offense level prevails, although the fact that other guidelines are 
relevant may, pursuant to the guidelines manual, result in a longer 
recommended sentence.88 In any event, each offense guideline specifies 
an initial base offense level with which to begin. Theoretically, at least, 
the spread permits a ranking of severity of crimes such that murder, for 
instance, should likely be assigned a higher number than a minor 
assault. 
Significantly, the base offense level is merely the starting point. Not 
every crime is alike in terms of intentionality, cruelty, and harm. As the 
Supreme Court has posited, “every element of every statute can be 
imaginatively transformed . . . so that every crime is seen as containing 
an infinite number of sub-crimes corresponding to ‘all the possible ways 
an individual can commit’ it.”89 The Court further fancifully illustrates 
the importance of context, drawing on the popular board game Clue: 
“Think: Professor Plum, in the ballroom, with the candlestick?; Colonel 
Mustard, in the conservatory, with the rope, on a snowy day, to cover up 
his affair with Mrs. Peacock?”90 Hence, the vast majority of offense 
guidelines provide for additional levels to be added to, or on fewer 
occasions subtracted from, the base offense number for facts or 
 
 84 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 4 (2012). 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at ch. 5, pt. A. 
 87 Id. § 1B1.1. 
 88 Id. § 3D1.3. 
 89 Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2290–91 (2013) (quoting United States v. 
Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d 915, 927 (2011)). 
 90 Id. at 2291. 
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circumstances that are believed to be aggravating or mitigating, 
respectively. These are called specific offense characteristics. 
Once the base offense level plus the specific offense characteristics 
are summed, the court next considers other arithmetic adjustments, 
whether upward or downward, that are generic to the offense involved. 
These are additional facts or circumstances relative to the crime 
committed, victims, or the offender that are considered to impact 
culpability measures. Examples include using a minor to commit a 
crime91 and preying on an especially vulnerable victim as upward 
modifications,92 while acceptance of responsibility triggers a reduction.93 
In the end, a final offense level is calculated. The court then finds the 
sentencing range by locating the relevant cell in the sentencing grid by 
matching the defendant’s criminal history score on the horizontal axis 
with the final offense level on the vertical axis. The result is a range of 
months within which the guidelines provide the actual sentence should 
be situated. The court next considers whether the guidelines’ departure 
standards are applicable and/or whether the statutory sentencing factors 
are convincing enough to vary from the range so provided. 
Noticeably, the Commission specifically developed the guidelines 
themselves to permit a plethora of things to be counted. Since the levels 
are essentially points, these calculations represent minute 
quantifications of harm. Perhaps a simple example will help explain the 
system. Suppose that Zigfried is convicted of robbery. The case facts 
indicate Zigfried, while in possession of a knife, threatened the victim 
and stole from him cash and goods amounting to $11,000. Upon arrest, 
Zigfried expressed remorse and quickly pled guilty. Zigfried is now to be 
sentenced. The most applicable guideline is for robbery, and it is 
designated § 2B3.1. The base offense level is twenty. Of the seven types 
of specific offense characteristics within that guideline, two are germane. 
The use of the knife likely qualifies for a three level enhancement for 
possessing a weapon during the offense and the amount of loss situated 
between $10,000 and $50,000 earns a one level increase. The sum is now 
twenty-four. The court would likely adjust the total based on a guideline 
that permits a two level decrease for the acceptance of responsibility. 
Assume no other guideline adjustment or departure provision applies. 
The final offense level is twenty-two. Zigfried’s criminal history score, 
determined through another series of calculations is in the third ordinal 
category. The sentencing grid yields a range of fifty-one to sixty-three 
months. In the end, this type of incremental quantification of harm is 
akin to actuarial sentencing. And if reformers are believed, these 
quantities are preferable over the quality of judicial reasoning. 
 
 91 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.4. 
 92 Id. § 3A1.1. 
 93 Id. § 3E1.1. 
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The federal sentencing scheme is calculable in several other 
important ways. Mandatory minimums are easily quantified, at least in 
terms of lower thresholds of punishment. The truth-in-sentencing 
aspect of the parole abolition reform rendered more assessable the 
duration of the sentence prisoners would serve. Finally, the tenet of 
calculability is fulfilled in the Commission’s perennial production of 
sentencing statistics to represent actual sentencing practices. These 
measures offer the Commission’s activities a guise of empiricism. Every 
year, the Commission produces a sourcebook of federal sentencing 
statistics, available on the agency’s website, in which it calibrates a host 
of sentencing measures for the prior fiscal year. The sourcebooks, for 
example, contain mean and median sentences for all offenses and then 
in finer increments such as general categories of crimes and then 
specific offense guidelines. The sourcebooks parse numbers regarding 
the application of specific offense characteristics, departures, and 
reported reasons for sentences issued. With an eye toward Congress’s 
sensibilities, the sourcebooks provide overall statistical measures on 
judicial compliance with guidelines as a whole, as well as appraised by 
district and offense, which can be taken as indicators of disparity (or 
uniformity) in sentencing practices. The sourcebooks offer empirical 
data on demographic characteristics of offenders, as well, and plot those 
against the foregoing measures. 
The Commission has even outsourced calculability in the sense of 
permitting external parties to run data analyses by making certain 
datafiles available in a form that is functional with standard statistical 
software.94 In addition, other federal government sites helpfully offer 
datasets for external researchers. This study utilizes some of these 
compilations of data in its analysis in various places herein to support 
certain assertions. The first is to emphasize the mass sentencing theory. 
Figure 1 is a visual representing the sheer numbers of defendants 
sentenced in recent years, categorized by type of offense (excluding a 
residual group of unknown offenses). 
  
 
 94 I used either Microsoft Excel or SPSS, depending on the sophistication of the data 
analysis. 
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Figure 195 
As the foregoing suggests, all of this data-crunching is similar to 
McDonald’s tracking over time the various food items purchased, costs, 
customer demographics, and, in the end, profitability. As a more 
specific analogy, recall the McDonald’s practice of highlighting the 
numbers served. In McSentencing, this is similar to the numbers of 
defendants sentenced in the scheme of mass sentencing. Figure 1 is used 
here as an exemplar for quantifying numbers of defendants “served.” It 
shows that numbers increased since 1998 in every category of crime 
shown except violent offenses, with immigration crimes particularly 
experiencing inflated numbers. Overall, the number of defendants 
sentenced during the period represented increased from about 51,000 in 
1998 to over 85,000 in 2011. 
In sum (so to speak), the calculability portion of McSentencing is 
represented through numerous counts, which are in essence additive 
quantifications of discrete harms. As in McDonaldization, the drive 
toward objective quantifications overshadows human subjectivities. 
While sentencing judges must articulate reasons for their final 
sentences, they do so only after exercises of completing Commission-
 
 95 Data compiled from Federal Criminal Case Processing Statistics, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.bjs.gov/fjsrc (follow “Offenders sentenced: trends” hyperlink; 
then input range of years) (last visited June 7, 2014). 
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issued worksheets containing numerous pages of numeric data 
processing. Pursuant to the reforms, federal punishment at its 
foundation is sentencing by numbers. 
C.     Efficiency 
The federal sentencing reforms conceivably offer efficient means to 
their expected ends. In McSentencing, the ends comprise terminal 
sentencing outcomes. The guidelines’ calculations just mentioned are 
designed, in part, to streamline the process of federal sentencing.96 In 
the previous indeterminate system, the sentencing judge had no real 
orienting guideposts, other than vague philosophical notions of 
deterrence, retribution, and rehabilitation. The guidelines somewhat 
automate the process of determining punishments. They provide the 
starting point, and through a sequential series of specific calculations, 
offer end results. As with the corporate headquarters of McDonald’s, the 
Commission represents a centralized office that maintains detailed 
training and operations manuals containing usually explicit instructions 
to guide and structure sentence calculations, with the purpose of 
achieving practiced and uniform results.97 
Still, sentencing reforms have yielded efficiencies beyond just the 
routinized exercise of quantifying harms. The whole system is a sort of 
assembly-line of justice, requiring different players to fulfill their 
assignments.98 Investigators are basically the initial instigators by 
referring individuals suspected of crime to United States attorneys. 
Prosecutors generally pursue plea negotiations, potentially also 
including direct sentencing negotiations, or brings cases to trial. Upon 
conviction, whether by plea or trial, cases are handled by federal 
probation officers, who conduct presentence investigations and execute 
the initial guidelines’ calculations. Probation officers eventually present 
the reports and provide sentencing recommendations to the assigned 
district judges. The resulting commodities in this assembly-line are final 
sentences. At the end of this process, sentencing hearings in front of 
district courts may simply be ceremonious proceedings,99 particularly if 
the judge accepts a plea deal or the parties have few issues with the 
probation officer’s report. This has the added efficiency of not 
 
 96 Erik Luna, Gridland: An Allegorical Critique of Federal Sentencing, 96 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 25, 44 (2005). 
 97 See generally U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION, http://www.ussc.gov (last visited June 7, 2014). 
 98 Matthew R. Robinson, McDonaldization of America’s Courts, Police, Courts, and 
Corrections, in MCDONALDIZATION: THE READER 85, 87 (George Ritzer ed., 3d ed. 2006). 
 99 Porter, supra note 76, at 487; Jack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge’s Second Impression of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 357, 364 (1992) (lamenting judge’s focus on 
checking the probation officer’s math rather than studying pre-sentence reports). 
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burdening the court’s docket. Nevertheless, this represents a sort of 
mechanized system of justice100 in which each actor completes specific 
tasks and passes the results along to the next line worker, though there 
are obvious overlapping responsibilities. 
The guidelines system recognizes this assembly-line of justice and 
expressly exploits it to accelerate criminal adjudication. In the federal 
system, plea bargains have become the focal point of efficiency. 
Undoubtedly, the system has become increasingly reliant upon avoiding 
the time and expense of formal trials by incentivizing informal plea 
arrangements.101 Figure 2 shows that the rate of pleas has increased 
during the last few decades. 
Figure 2102 
 
The likelihood of a plea is now near perfect. In fiscal year 2013, 
ninety-seven percent of federal criminal cases were resolved by pleas.103 
 
 100 FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SCALE OF IMPRISONMENT 161 (1991) 
(referring to grid-type sentencing guidelines as providing a “mechanical approach” to 
determining punishment). 
 101 Bohm, supra note 64, at 129–30. 
 102 Data aggregated from HINDELANG CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH CTR., UNIV. OF ALBANY, 
Criminal Defendants Disposed in U.S. District Courts, by Type of Disposition, 1945–2010, 
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, available at http://www.albany.edu/
sourcebook/tost_5.html#5_w; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2012 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL 
SENTENCING STATISTICS fig.C (2013), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_
Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2012/sbtoc12.htm [hereinafter 2012 
SOURCEBOOK]. 
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Notably, the progressively extreme rates of pleas are significantly 
promoted by the guidelines system. Four key provisions in the 
guidelines equip prosecutors with the tools to force, or encourage, 
depending on one’s predilection, guilty pleas. Further, prosecutors and 
judges use these provisions to incent pleas even earlier in the 
proceedings. 
First, perhaps the most powerful carrot for attracting guilty pleas 
and speedy resolutions, is the availability of the acceptance of 
responsibility reduction. Guideline Section 3E1.1 permits a court to 
grant a reduction if the defendant “clearly demonstrates acceptance of 
responsibility for his offense.”104 The commentary provides some 
examples of what actions might suffice, such as truthfully admitting the 
conduct that comprised the offense and any relevant conduct, promptly 
surrendering, and entering a guilty plea before the commencement of 
trial.105 The section’s notes signal a type of trial penalty: “This 
adjustment is not intended to apply to a defendant who puts the 
government to its burden of proof at trial” though the commentary also 
indicates that conviction by trial is not an automatic bar to receiving the 
downward departure.106 It is expressly acknowledged that this reward is 
designed to foster efficiency by allowing prosecutors to cease preparing 
for trial and direct their resources elsewhere.107 
The assembly-line of justice strategically uses the acceptance of 
responsibility provision to expedite adjudication and to get to the end 
product—a certain punishment—in a punctual manner.108 Importantly, 
the commentary specifically states that the timeliness of accepting 
responsibility is relevant to qualifying for the reduction.109 Practitioners 
report that some judges encourage pleas earlier in the process by setting 
deadlines by which defendants must plead in order to be eligible for 
acceptance of responsibility benefits.110 Defense counsel also report that 
prosecutors use the lure of acceptance of responsibility to encourage 
 
 103 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, PRELIMINARY FISCAL YEAR 2013 DATA 42 tbl.26 (2013), 
available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/Federal_Sentencing_Statistics/Quarterly_
Sentencing_Updates/USSC_2013_Quarter_Report_4th.pdf. 
 104 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(a) (2012). 
 105 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 cmt. nn.1(A), 1(D), 3. 
 106 Id. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.2. The commentary provides that a defendant may still earn this credit 
despite not pleading if the defendant goes to trial for reasons other than denying factual guilt, 
such as to challenge the constitutionality of a statute or the applicability of the statute to his 
conduct. Id. 
 107 Id. § 3E1.1. 
 108 Jeffrey T. Ulmer et al., Trial Penalties in Federal Sentencing: Extra-Guidelines Factors and 
District Variation, 27 JUST. Q. 560, 582 (2010) (surveying federal judges, finding one-third 
reported that acceptance of responsibility served organizational efficiency purposes). 
 109 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 cmt. n.1(H). 
 110 Margareth Etienne, The Declining Utility of the Right to Counsel in Federal Criminal 
Courts: An Empirical Study on the Diminished Role of Defense Attorney Advocacy Under the 
Sentencing Guidelines, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 425, 448–50 (2004). 
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quicker pleas while simultaneously threatening to withhold them if a 
defense counsel wishes to file any motions or challenge any guidelines 
issue.111 Thus, the provision operates in practice to streamline the 
adjudication process. The use of the acceptance of responsibility 
reduction is widespread. The Commission reports that in fiscal year 
2012, ninety-five percent of defendants sentenced received an 
acceptance of responsibility reduction.112 Using Commission data files 
and standard statistical software, a few other measures are relevant. A 
statistical cross tabulation using Commission data shows that in fiscal 
year 2012, very close to one hundred percent of defendants who 
received any acceptance of responsibility reduction were those who 
pled, meaning that very few defendants who went to trial were granted 
it. Agreeing to plea almost guaranteed this reduction. Of those 
defendants who pled, ninety-eight percent received acceptance of 
responsibility bonuses. 
The second guidelines provision that operates as an incentive to 
advance the progression of cases is fittingly referred to officially as early 
disposition programs, or more colloquially, fast-track sentencing. On its 
face, Section 5K3.1 permits a downward variance in jurisdictions in 
which the district’s United States Attorney has formally established such 
a program.113 The express purpose of the deduction is to permit districts 
with large numbers of particular offenses to efficiently process them by 
rewarding defendants for speed.114 While fast-track program policies 
vary, 
these programs typically ask defendants to waive indictment, 
discovery, and presentence reports; plead guilty at the initial 
appearance; and consent to immediate sentencing. In return, 
prosecutors agree to recommend downward departures or let 
defendants plead to lesser charges. Because these cases move 
much more quickly, prosecutors can process many more of 
them.115 
The fast-track provision has evolved from the perspective of the 
Attorney General’s office. In 2003, the then Attorney General issued a 
memorandum stating fast-track programs should be “properly reserved 
for exceptional circumstances, such as where the resources of a district 
would otherwise be significantly strained by the large volume of a 
 
 111 Id. 
 112 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 102, at tbl.19. 
 113 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K3.1 (also requiring approval by the Attorney 
General). Congress approved this type of departure in the PROTECT Act of 2003. Prosecutorial 
Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 
108-21, 117 Stat. 650. 
 114 United States v. Anaya-Aguirre, 704 F.3d 514, 517 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 115 Stephanos Bibas, Federalism: Regulating Local Variations in Federal Sentencing, 58 STAN. 
L. REV. 137, 146 (2005). 
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particular category of cases.”116 At that time, fast-track programs for 
illegal entry were instituted in those southwestern jurisdictions 
struggling with large immigration caseloads.117 However, this situation 
caused controversy because of the presence of an early disposition 
program for illegal entry in some districts but not others, meaning that 
similarly-situated offenders were differentially treated based on the 
location of their sentencing districts.118 As a result, in early 2012, the 
then current Deputy Attorney General officially authorized a fast-track 
program for all districts for illegal entry cases.119 The Commission 
reports that in fiscal year 2012, about eleven percent of all defendants 
sentenced received fast-track reductions, with the vast majority in cases 
of immigration offenses and drug trafficking.120 A cross tabulation using 
Commission data files shows that, consistent with the provision’s 
design, all of them involved guilty pleas. 
Third, the substantial assistance guideline offers another option to 
enhance expediency. Under Section 5K1.1, upon the motion of the 
government, a court may grant a reduction when “the defendant has 
provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of 
another person who has committed an offense.”121 This provision 
appears mainly to concern improving the government’s productivity in 
terms of prosecuting others, but it also fosters efficiency concerns with 
respect to the assisting defendant. One of the factors listed to consider in 
granting the substantial assistance reduction is the timeliness of the 
defendant’s assistance.122 And prosecutors are known to threaten the 
loss of this reduction if, despite being of service, the defendant refuses to 
plea.123 The substantial assistance benefit can be particularly alluring for 
defendants facing charges carrying mandatory minimums as it rather 
uniquely can serve, with Congress’s official support, to vitiate otherwise 
mandatory minimums.124 Almost twelve percent of defendants 
sentenced in fiscal year 2012 received substantial assistance 
departures.125 A cross tabulation showed that almost all substantial 
assistance awards were issued to defendants who pled. 
 
 116 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, DEPARTURE AND VARIANCE PRIMER 27 (2013), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Legal/Primers/Primer_Departure_and_Variance.pdf (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 117 United States v. Reyes-Hernandez, 624 F.3d 405, 409 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 118 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 116, at 27. 
 119 Id. 
 120 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 102, at tbl. 30A. 
 121 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2012). 
 122 Id. § 5K1.1(a)(5). 
 123 Ulmer et al., supra note 108, at 583. 
 124 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 cmt. n.1 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(3) 
(2012) & 28 U.S.C. § 994(n)). 
 125 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 102, at tbl.30. 
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The fourth guideline provision that promotes pleas works in the 
opposite direction than the prior three, but is still used in operation to 
accelerate adjudication. Instead of reducing sentences, the obstruction 
of justice adjustment adds levels. Section 3C1.1 provides an 
enhancement if the defendant obstructed the administration of justice 
“with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the 
instant offense of conviction.”126 This adjustment is not used often, 
representing just two percent of cases in fiscal year 2012.127 Again 
running analyses on fiscal year 2012 data files, results indicate that in 
those cases in which this enhancement was given, thirty-one percent 
were for defendants whose cases went to trial. 
On a completely different front, though still belonging within the 
rubric of efficiencies, past criminal history can significantly increase 
punishment. In the context of penal policy, cliffs for repeat offenders are 
efficient in the sense of achieving the greatest incapacitation effect for 
the most dangerous criminals.128 The maximum incapacitation effect is 
consistent with a goal of efficiency since it provides an expedient and 
direct means for protecting the public.129 Considered next is the final of 
the four main beneficial tenets of McDonaldization as applied to the 
McSentencing ideology. 
D.     Control 
This aspect of McDonaldization is clearly represented by federal 
sentencing reforms. Mandatory minimums, statutory maximums, and 
presumptive guidelines are quintessential tools for dictating specific 
punishments for offenders. Definitive numbers are themselves 
dominating entities. Studies in social psychology show that 
recommended sentence lengths have a strong anchoring effect on 
judicial outcomes.130 By now, it should be clear that the four tenets of 
McDonaldization service each other. Predictive measures offered by 
guidelines, standardized guidelines calculations, and efficient systems 
inducing quick pleas all also serve as control functions. 
The guidelines system itself, enacted expressly to reduce judicial 
discretion and to promote uniformity, is evidently orchestrated to 
reduce the hundreds of district judges to relative automatons in the 
 
 126 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1. 
 127 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 102, at tbl.18. 
 128 Shichor, supra note 38, at 476. 
 129 In criminology, the term is “selective incapacitation.” See generally Stephen D. 
Gottfredson & Don M. Gottfredson, Selective Incapacitation?, 478 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & 
SOC. SCI. 135 (1985). 
 130 See, e.g., Birte Englich & Thomas Mussweiler, Sentencing Under Uncertainty: Anchoring 
Effects in the Courtroom, 31 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1535 (2001). 
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operation of federal sentencing.131 The system is designed to render the 
judge merely the last worker in the sentencing assembly-line. Congress 
pushes for this result through mandatory minimums and by enacting a 
presumptive guidelines system. Thus, Congress seeks to retain much 
control though also subjects the judiciary to following the bidding of the 
Commission as Congress’s designee. The Commission, variously 
responding to legislative fiat and on its own initiative, also strives to 
commandeer federal sentencing away from judicial discretion. The 
relationship is not very symbiotic. The agency has been described as 
hegemonic and dogmatically prone to issuing diktats with little 
explanation.132 The institution acts as sort of an agency manager, 
continuously vying to corral federal judges into strict adherence to its 
rules and procedures manual—i.e., the guidelines.133 
The Commission seeks to manage through quite detailed rules. 
Each primary guideline contains commentary and notes, some rather 
lengthy. The Commission appears to try to address every minute 
circumstance for each type of offender and each crime. To achieve 
control and gain adherence, the Commission publishes countless 
publications and offers compliance trainings throughout the country 
multiple times a year.134 Not only does the Commission attempt to 
decree what federal judges must do in the sentencing process, it also 
instructs them as to what they shall not do. For instance, the 
Commission has asserted in sentencing decisions that judges cannot 
consider sex, religion, and socio-economic status.135 In other words, the 
Commission pontificates upon which considerations constitute 
extralegal factors it deems inappropriate in assessment of punishment 
for criminal activity. 
Thus far, this Article has hopefully established the relevance and 
salience of the four core tenets of McDonaldization in conceptualizing 
the federal sentencing scheme per the legislative reforms. On their face, 
their existence is often perceived as advantageous to a system or process. 
To more fully justify the sobriquet of McSentencing, the accompanying 
paradox of the fulfillment of the McDonaldized form of scientific 
 
 131 But see Ronald F. Wright, Sentencers, Bureaucrats, and the Administrative Law 
Perspective on the Federal Sentencing Commission, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 3, 42 (1991) (contending 
the guidelines do not reduce judges to mere functionaries, as judges normally must follow rules 
and the guidelines still provide them some discretion, considering their decisions cannot be 
overruled by the Commission itself). 
 132 KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE 
FEDERAL COURTS 95, 99 (1998). 
 133 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT ON THE CONTINUING IMPACT OF UNITED STATES 
V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING pt. A (2012), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_
and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/Booker_Reports/2012_Booker/
index. cfm [hereinafter BOOKER REPORT]. 
 134 See generally U.S. SENT’G COMMISSION, supra note 97. 
 135 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.10 (2012). 
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management must be supported. The fifth tenet of McDonaldization is 
the aftermath, which Ritzer called the irrationality of rationality. In 
other words, despite the combination of predictability, efficiency, 
calculability, and control representing patterns of rational thought, this 
philosophy holds that unreasonable consequences are inevitable. Ritzer 
has left the irrationality of rationality dimension a rather broad and 
unmoored concept for a rigorous academic study. Yet its ethos is 
analogous to another ideology—one developed by Robert Merton—and 
generally known as the law of unintended consequences.136 Notably, 
Merton outlined specific standards that permit a better frame of 
reference for an analysis of the detrimental flaws resulting from 
whatever formal rational system or policy the researcher is studying. 
The following Part of this Article, therefore, explores the irrationality of 
rationality in the form of the law of unintended consequences and 
applies it to the federal sentencing scheme and the ramifications of 
reform. 
III.     FEDERAL SENTENCING AND THE LAW OF UNINTENDED 
CONSEQUENCES 
Generally considering the ideals of uniformity and proportionality, 
sentencing reformers certainly maintained good intentions. 
Nonetheless, federal sentencing law has experienced instability ever 
since the reform legislation.137 As the United States Attorney General’s 
Office recently recognized, 
for many years, the federal sentencing system has been a target 
of criticism for Members of Congress, judges, academics, and 
practitioners. These criticisms range from concerns about 
statutory mandatory minimum penalties and undue leniency 
or severity for certain offenses to unwarranted racial and ethnic 
 
 136 Robert K. Merton, The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action, 1 AM. 
SOC. REV. 894 (1936) [hereinafter Unanticipated Consequences]. Merton later described the law 
of unintended consequences as similar to the Thomas Theorem, which is the thesis from 
another eminent sociologist, W.I. Thomas, that “[i]f men define situations as real, they are real 
in their consequences.” Robert K. Merton, The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, 8 ANTIOCH REV. 193, 
193 (1948) (internal quotation marks omitted). Max Weber wrote that “[i]t is undeniably true, 
indeed a fundamental truth of all history . . . that the final result of political activity often, nay, 
regularly, bears very little relation to the original intention: often, indeed, it is quite the 
opposite of what was first intended.” Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in PRINCETON 
READINGS IN POLITICAL THOUGHT: ESSENTIAL TEXTS SINCE PLATO 499 (M. Cohen & N. 
Fermon eds., 1996). 
 137 Symposium, Judicial Discretion: A Look Forward and a Look Back Five Years After 
Booker, 22 FED. SENT’G REP. 297 (2010) (statement of Douglas Berman). 
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disparities in sentencing decisions and the scope of conduct 
considered at sentencing.138 
Today, the federal sentencing system is in crisis.139 Compliance rates 
have plunged, particularly following Booker. For fiscal year 2013, half of 
sentences were within guidelines ranges.140 Plus there is substantive 
evidence that mandatory minimum laws are being circumvented.141 The 
obvious question then is how were the objectives of uniformity and 
proportionality sidetracked and what other unforeseen results have 
occurred? This Part provides some answers by applying the law of 
unintended circumstances to the McSentencing regime just outlined. 
This Article submits that the law of unintended consequences 
offers an appropriate alternative to examining troublesome issues with 
rational thought as theorized within the McDonaldization of society 
dogma.142 Of course, this use of the term “law” is meant colloquially, 
and not to signify formal legislative activity. Popularized by the 
prominent sociologist Robert K. Merton, the law of unintended 
consequences involves purposive social action.143 Merton observed 
motivated human conduct, whether accomplished by individuals or 
formal organizations, at times represents rational action, but at other 
times it becomes irrational in the sense of not actually constituting the 
best means to attain the actor’s desired ends.144 Like Ritzer, Merton was 
rather fatalistic about the consequences of rationalization. While 
Merton reasonably accepted that not all unforeseen results would 
necessarily be embraced as negative when considered retrospectively by 
the actor, he also hypothesized that undesirable consequences were 
virtually inevitable from purposive human action.145 It is suggested here 
that McSentencing is a form of institutionalized purposive action in that 
the reforms pressed by Congress and the presumptive guidelines urged 
by the Commission represent a rationalization of thought designed to 
effectuate proper and consistent punishments. The reason Merton’s 
conceptualization is more useful for an academic study than Ritzer’s 
irrationality of rationality idea is that Merton outlined five causes of 
unintended consequences, thus offering a convenient structure for 
 
 138 Lanny A. Breuer, The Attorney General’s Sentencing and Corrections Working Group: A 
Progress Report, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 110, 110 (2010). 
 139 Amy Baron-Evans & Thomas W. Hillier, II, The Commission’s Legislative Agenda to 
Restore Mandatory Guidelines, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 293 (2013); Luna, supra note 96, at 54. 
 140  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 103, at 1 tbl.1. 
 141 See infra notes 210–13 and accompanying text. 
 142 Merton’s original formulation used the term “unanticipated consequences.” 
Unanticipated Consequences, supra note 136, at 896. Still, the analogous phrasing of 
“unintended consequences” for his theorem has prevailed in academic and popular literature. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. In contrast, Merton noted that purposive action could beget beneficial results that 
were unintended as well, such as through chance. Id. at 897 n.9. 
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analysis. These include ignorance, error, short-term focus, competing 
values, and self-fulfilling prophecy. Brief descriptions of the five causes 
follow. 
The first cause of unanticipated results is ignorance. Merton 
clarified this does not necessarily entail engaging in social action with no 
information.146 Unintended consequences can result from a lack of 
sufficient knowledge to properly plan and frame our actions to beget 
successful results.147 When we engage in purposive social action, we are 
necessarily making predictions about how best to achieve our desired 
goal. Humans often make these predictions based on past experiences. 
But we are often deceived into falsely believing that observed 
associations between events are causally related, when they are merely 
stochastic associations.148 
Nonetheless, the actor may actually be cognizant of his lapses in 
full knowledge and predictive abilities, yet risk unintended 
consequences because he is forced to act anyway. One may have an 
immediate need, whether in actuality or simply by belief, to initiate a 
course of action, despite insufficient time to deliberate and prepare.149 
Another reason to act, even when one is aware of his imperfect 
knowledge, is due to the limited availability of resources to more fully 
explore past experiences or consider alternative options.150 
Error is the second cause of unintended consequences. Potential 
miscalculations can occur in such areas as appraising the present 
situation, making inferences therefrom, selecting the course of action, or 
executing the plan.151 Error may arise when the actor fails to 
systematically and thoroughly evaluate, or pathologically follows, a 
certain course. For instance, humans often favor routine. However, 
reliance on habitual action can generate undesirable outcomes. Even 
though a prior conduct led to a desirable result, automatic and un-
deliberative actions may ignore that circumstances have changed or that 
the same causal result may not apply in all conditions.152 Thus, what 
may appear to have been rational and reasonable predictions based on 
actual past experiences become, in retrospect, unreasonable in practice. 
Ignoring troubling or conflicting evidence may cause negative 
consequences to become further exacerbated.153 
The third factor in creating unintended consequences is an undue 
focus on short-term goals. Merton referred to this as an “imperious 
 
 146 Id. at 900. 
 147 Id. at 898. 
 148 Id.  
 149 Id. at 900. 
 150 Id.  
 151 Id. at 901. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. 
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immediacy of interest,” whereby the actor is myopically intent on 
foreseeable immediate goals, to the exclusion of considering additional 
and future consequences.154 The attainment of a short-term goal may 
actually preclude us from realizing other, perhaps equally important, 
objectives.155 A focus on the near-term may impede our envisioning the 
bigger picture. 
Closely related is the fourth factor, basic values. A core set of 
fundamental values may necessitate purposive social action that blinds 
us from considering possible interactions. In the social world, actions do 
not operate in a vacuum. Merton offered examples: 
The empirical observation is incontestable: activities oriented 
toward certain values release processes which so react as to 
change the very scale of values which precipitated them. This 
process may in part be due to the fact that when a system of 
basic values enjoins certain specific actions, adherents are not 
concerned with the objective consequences of these actions but 
only with the subjective satisfaction of duty well performed.156 
Dominant values may also render us so focused on them that we 
discount the fact that our actions may impact related fields in negative 
ways, and that because those related fields are so connected, they may be 
reactive and alter the course of planned events.157 
The final circumstance leading to unintended consequences 
basically implies the social construct of the self-fulfilling prophecy. 
“Public predictions of future social developments are frequently not 
sustained precisely because the prediction has become a new element in 
the concrete situation, thus tending to change the initial course of 
developments.”158 Predictions made on assumptions of all “other-
things-being-equal” are necessarily counter-productive since in human 
interactions not all things will be equal.159 The concept resonates with 
purposive social action since the very purpose becomes an interfering 
artifact. Designated purposes can fundamentally alter the course of 
social processes and prejudice the results.160 In this sense, the situation 
becomes a self-defeating prophecy in that the prediction prevents what 
is predicted from happening.161 In sum, the inevitability of unintended 
 
 154 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Merton provides as an example cavemen who 
carried their mates to their caves to satisfy their immediate sexual desires, which 
unintentionally led over time to the development of the family unit. Id. at 902. 
 155 Id. at 902. 
 156 Id. at 903.  
 157 Id.  
 158 Id. at 903–04. 
 159 Id. at 904 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. at 903. 
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consequences reminds us that it is hubris to believe we can entirely, 
perhaps even to some small degree, control a complex social world. 
This Article uses the foregoing five causes of unintended 
consequences as an appropriate analytical tool to study a specific area of 
law. In other words, Merton’s law of unintended consequences offers a 
lens with which to observe a particular law’s creation, its operation, and 
its results. But first it should be established whether this is a proper 
theoretical marriage. Certainly, legislation is quintessentially a collective 
form of purposive social action, and humans have always exhibited a 
social tendency to use the law as a tool to achieve social goods or avoid 
perceived cultural ills.162 We use legislation to redress wrongs, to 
maintain the status quo, to alter social structures, and to shape power 
relations. Our immanent penchant for legislation exists even though 
socio-legal scholars insist it is a rare occurrence that the desired results 
of laws are fully effectuated.163 As Merton himself recognized, man 
continues to legislate with the goal of achieving objectives despite all 
available information providing clear evidence this “cannot be thus 
achieved.”164 
But why do laws generally fail to procure their intended objectives? 
Legislation very clearly embeds its intended goals into the process, and 
results are naturally biased thereby. Laws are extraordinarily powerful 
social acts as in our social world the law connotes officialdom, gravity, 
and expertise. Consequently, they naturally elicit strong reactions. 
“Laws . . . shift incentives, realign individual interests, alter human 
motivations, and disrupt social equilibrium, thereby arousing corrective 
counterweights among even the most obedient.”165 It has been observed 
that the current legal environment in the United States is particularly 
perverse. The American legal system 
has devolved into absurdities that mock the pretensions of 
modern law, such as secret government memoranda justifying 
torture; federal agencies that insulate the very institutions they 
are supposed to regulate; an incarceration rate unparalleled in 
any “free” society; a Supreme Court that refuses to give its own 
decision the status of precedent [referring to the Court’s 
decision in Bush v. Gore regarding the winner of their 
presidential election]; and a chief executive who instructs the 
executive branch not to enforce the legislation that he signs 
 
 162 Frederick W. Preston & Roger I. Roots, Law and Its Unintended Consequences, 47 AM. 
BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1371, 1371–72 (2004). 
 163 J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of Regulatory 
Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757, 814 (2003). 
 164 Robert K. Merton, Manifest and Latent Functions, in SOCIAL THEORY: THE 
MULTICULTURAL AND CLASSIC READINGS 304, 307 (Charles Lemert ed., 2d ed. 1999). 
 165 Roger I. Roots, When Laws Backfire: Unintended Consequences of Public Policy, 47 AM. 
BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1376, 1386 (2004). 
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into law [referring to President George W. Bush’s prolific use 
of limiting signing statements].166 
All of this segues nicely into the law of unintended consequences. 
Merton’s central idea was based on the notion that purposive human 
action appears rational at the outset yet yields irrational returns. 
Interestingly, we continue to believe in the social construct of the law’s 
unique power to achieve its intended goals despite our experiences that 
results are often paradoxical. Society’s continued conviction that laws 
have the ability to right wrongs and provide social benefits veers toward 
the religious in that it is, in reality, based merely on faith.167 The fact that 
legislation bears unanticipated results, therefore, appears axiomatic. 
In sum, Merton’s law of unintended consequences is an 
appropriate heuristic device to examine legal actions. The analysis that 
follows, correspondingly, applies the ideology of the law of unintended 
consequences to federal sentencing reforms. The most important 
reforms are the federal guidelines system, reliance upon mandatory 
minimum statutes, and, to a lesser degree, the truth-in-sentencing law. 
Before addressing each of the five causes of unintended consequences, it 
is necessary to identify the laws’ intended goals. It is widely recognized 
that Congress’ intended to create a more scientific system to achieve 
uniformity in sentencing and to reduce unnecessary disparities, the two 
generally being corresponding articulations of the same point, and to 
foster proportionality in punishments.168 
At its heart, this Article contends that the reforms have not 
adequately achieved their intended goals. Indeed, the current state of 
federal sentencing is in disarray as a result. Table 1 is a summary of the 
major arguments that will follow for how the law of unintended 
consequences recognizes the impediments that have prevented the 
reforms from achieving the reformers’ idealistic objectives. 
  
 
 166 Douglas Litowitz, Max Weber and Franz Kafka: A Shared Vision of Modern Law, 7 L., 
CULTURE & HUMAN. 48, 49–50 (2011) (footnotes omitted). 
 167 Preston & Roots, supra note 162, at 1373. 
 168 STITH & CABRANES, supra note 132, at 13, 40. 
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Table 1 
Cause of Unintended 
Consequences 
Application to Federal Sentencing Reforms 
Insufficient Knowledge The inaugural Commission failed to settle on a primary 
sentencing philosophy, conduct a holistic ranking of 
federal crimes for proportionality purposes, or 
sufficiently engage empirical study. 
Error The reforms did not sufficiently cabin other avenues for 
discretion in sentencing, such as those arising from 
decisions by prosecutors, probation officers, and 
investigatory agents. 
Short-Term Focus The Commission’s decisions to focus on short-term 
goals of achieving high conformance statistics by judges 
and appeasing Congress’s desire for longer 
punishments disregarded the long-term effect of a 
burgeoning federal prison system. 
 
The goal of standardization resulted in a complicated 
guidelines system that spawned conflicts in 
interpretation, causing increased adjudication costs and 
burdened judicial caseloads. 
Competing Basic Values The policy of real-offense sentencing promoted 
proportionality over the values of efficiency and 
fairness to defendants. 
 
Emphasis on creating metrics trumped providing 
coherent sentencing policies to guide judicial decision-
making. 
Self-Fulfilling Prophecy The prophecy that mechanized justice would yield 
uniformity instead fostered nonconformance. 
 
The goal of a proportional system became self-
defeating when the actors’ whose decisions were 
required to achieve that objective rebelled.  
A.     Insufficient Knowledge 
Substantial evidence demonstrates that the creation of the 
guidelines system suffered multiple knowledge and planning gaps. 
Numerous reports indicate that the inaugural Commission was a 
disorganized organization and its initial commissioners were 
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unfortunately prone to conflicts and infighting.169 Shortly after the 
initial guidelines became law, a former commissioner publicly and 
vehemently criticized the Commission for failing to act like an “expert 
body,” instead “becoming a forum for expressing the members’ personal 
preferences.”170 At about the same time, the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO),171 the federal watchdog group at the time, 
audited the Commission and its activities, documenting a host of 
issues.172 The GAO asserted that the Commission had failed to comply 
with statutory requirements to develop a monitoring system, the project 
was beset by delays, the development of an evaluation program 
experienced cutbacks, the institution had weak internal controls, and 
conflicting projects existed among commissioners and staff.173 The GAO 
further faulted the Commission for inexplicably doubling, even 
quintupling, sentences for repeat offenders without also studying the 
cost of lengthening prison terms.174 
Supreme Court Justice Stephen G. Breyer was one of the initial 
commissioners, at the time serving as a federal circuit judge.175 Justice 
Breyer has essentially admitted that the major policies underlying the 
guidelines were not founded upon consensus, expert judgments, or even 
best practices.176 Instead, these policies represented compromises that 
the Commission determined were necessary for various ideological, 
administrative, institutional, and political reasons.177 For example, a 
holistic, comparative ranking of the severity of federal criminal laws was 
a necessary exercise to ensuring the system as a whole achieved the goal 
of proportionality. It was attempted but then abandoned.178 Justice 
Breyer explained that one reason the commissioners were unable to 
agree on a rank ordering was the political divisiveness in identifying the 
leading sentencing philosophy for the new system.179 Commissioners 
 
 169 See id. at 51–58. 
 170 Lowell Dodge et al., Congressional Oversight, 2 FED. SENT’G REP. 210, 222 (1990) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Apparently, one of the divisive issues that sidetracked the 
commissioners was an attempt to “resurrect through administrative action some long-dormant 
federal death penalty statutes. This bizarre proposal failed by one vote.” Alschuler, supra note 
49, at 926. 
 171 At the time the initial guidelines were enacted, the GAO’s official name was the General 
Accounting Office. Our Name, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., http://www.gao.gov/about/
namechange.html (last visited June 7, 2014).  
 172 Dodge et al., supra note 170, at 210. 
 173 Id. at 210–11. In response to such criticisms, the then Chair of the Commission, Judge 
William W. Wilkins, complained that the “Commission’s statutory mandate was demanding,” 
it had no blueprint to follow, and Congress had given it too little time. Id. at 215. 
 174 Id. at 222–23. 
 175 STITH & CABRANES, supra note 132, at 49. 
 176 See generally Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key 
Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1988). 
 177 See generally id.  
 178 Id. at 17. 
 179 Id. at 16–17. 
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variously promoted retribution and deterrence, reaching no consensus 
on which theory should prevail.180 Further, the ranking process was 
handicapped by instances in which individual commissioners would 
proffer their subjective views about the seriousness of their “pet” crimes, 
which would have resulted in increases in every area.181 Justice Breyer 
also admitted that the Commission lacked sufficient knowledge to 
create a system other than one in which sentence length was based 
primarily on past sentencing practices, although he noted that sentence 
recommendations for certain crimes were intentionally lengthened.182 
He ceded the anomaly: “It reflects a lack of adequate, detailed deterrence 
data, and it reflects the irrational results of any effort to apply ‘just 
deserts’ principles to detailed behavior through a group process. The 
result of this compromise is that the Commission’s results will reflect 
irrationality in past practice . . . .”183 On this front, the situation is 
reminiscent of Merton’s discussion of the force of habit and the causal 
link to unintended consequences by incautiously relying upon past 
experience while ignoring hints for concern. 
Paul H. Robinson, another of the initial commissioners and a 
prominent criminal law professor, went even further in expressing his 
displeasure. He publicly “dissented” from the inaugural guidelines, 
citing insufficient planning, study, organization, and forecasting.184 He 
specifically noted that the initial Commission undertook no analysis of 
 
 180 Id. at 16. A document issued by the Commission itself in 1987 defended its demurral, 
arguing that any choice between retribution and deterrence merely constituted an academic 
exercise and that sentencing outcomes would likely be the same under either philosophy. U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND 
POLICY STATEMENTS 16 (1987), available at http://www.fd.org/docs/select-topics---sentencing/
Supplementary-Report.pdf [hereinafter SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT]. The report also indicated 
that its choice to demure was compliant with Congress’s instruction that no single sentencing 
purpose should prevail. Id. This is a curious stance considering the Commission almost 
completely ignored the other sentencing purposes addressed by Congress involving 
rehabilitation and incapacitation. 
 181 Breyer, supra note 176, at 15–16. 
 182 Id. at 17. 
 183 Id. at 18. 
 184 PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISSENTING VIEW OF COMMISSIONER PAUL H. ROBINSON ON THE 
PROMULGATION OF SENTENCING GUIDELINES BY THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING 
COMMISSION 22 (May 1, 1987), available at www.law.upenn.edu/fac/phrobins/
usscDISSENT.pdf (“A process of informed policy-making and thoughtful drafting might have 
taken the following course: isolation of the significant issues, staff preparation of background 
research papers on each of the issues, discussion and debate of each background paper to 
identify the most likely resolutions of each issue, staff preparation of option papers on the 
advantages and disadvantages of each possible resolution, discussion and debate of each option, 
a vote and tentative resolution of each issue, drafting a guideline system that embodies each of 
the options tentatively selected, re-evaluation of the tentative resolutions after their integration 
into a single guideline system, clinical testing of the revised document, revision in light of the 
clinical testing, limited field-testing of the revised document, revision in light of the limited 
field-testing, full field-testing during a period when the guidelines would be only advisory 
(including orientation and training programs for judges, probation officers, prosecutors, and 
defense counsel), and final revision in light of the full field-testing.”). 
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empirical studies on deterrence or on public views about relevant 
sentencing factors and their proportional weights.185 Further, he 
lamented that the staff had conducted no impact assessments regarding 
potential rates of departure, regularity of sentences across judges, 
administrative burdens on sentencing processes, potential changes in 
the rates of pleas or trials, prison capacity and probation service issues, 
or community perspectives on reasonableness of the punishments.186 
One of the likely reasons that the Commission released its initial 
guidelines system, even in the face of a knowing lack of sufficient 
information, was a Congressionally-imposed deadline.187 Thus, even 
though the commissioners likely were aware of significant knowledge 
gaps, the statutory mandate required action. Still, moving forward by 
implementing a guidelines system developed in such an incautious 
manner was risky. A system created in such an information vacuum 
would be unlikely to comprise a quality means to achieve the desired 
goals. Without considering the public’s views on the reasonableness of 
punishments and without re-ranking federal crimes on a severity scale, 
the Commission undermined the goal of improving proportionality in 
sentencing. To the extent that the guidelines system was intended as a 
means to overcome what was already perceived as unfairness and lack of 
uniformity in past sentencing practices, basing the system largely on 
those same past practices appears to represent a failure in planning and, 
thereby, likely an ineffective method to achieve those goals. 
The foregoing has addressed the initial guidelines and the 
Commission’s initial policy choices. But the analyses resonate still today 
as many of the same knowledge failures continue to exist. The 
Commission has never completed a holistic ranking of offenses for 
proportionality and fairness purposes. Instead, it tends to conduct 
piecemeal work on specific guidelines that are the then current subject 
of debate.188 The Commission has neglected to adopt a principal theory 
of punishment for the system as a whole, and the guidelines tend to 
vicariously reflect retributive and deterrence purposes.189 Further, some 
of the most important policy decisions continue into the present time. 
 
 185 Id. at 3 . 
 186 Id. at 20. 
 187 Breyer, supra note 176, at 5. 
 188 See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY (2007), 
available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_
and_Reports/Drug_Topics/200205_RtC_Cocaine_Sentencing_Policy/200205_Cocaine_and_
Federal_Sentencing_Policy.pdf; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
OFFENSES (2012), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/
Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/Sex_Offense_Topics/201212_Federal_Child_
Pornography_Offenses/Full_Report_to_Congress.pdf [hereinafter CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
REPORT]. 
 189 Rehabilitation is another permitted goal of sentencing practices, yet the Commission has 
never seemed inclined to adopt it and it is generally not reflected in the guidelines. 
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Certain controversial policies, such as real-offense sentencing, 
consistent increases in the length of sentence recommendations, 
substantial reliance upon quantification methods, and failure to use the 
guidelines to help manage the prison population, will be developed 
further below. 
B.     Error 
The Commission appears to have adopted a liberalist perspective 
that consistency could be achieved primarily through the use of 
normative constraints to circumscribe the discretionary power of the 
judiciary. Such a myopic concentration on the judiciary was manifestly 
misguided from the very beginning. The Commission has strategically 
downplayed the existence, and the critical importance to the goal of 
uniformity, of other relevant and powerful players in the federal 
criminal justice system.190 In the assembly-line vision of the proposed 
McSentencing scheme, a relevant observation is that there are 
necessarily multiple players, each of whom can shape and manipulate 
the expected final product. 
1.     Prosecutorial Discretion 
In addition to the judiciary, the other group that is perhaps most 
often discussed in terms of influencing sentencing consists of 
prosecutors.191 Many federal criminal law experts have observed that the 
implementation of determinate sentencing immanently fails to achieve 
its ambitions of uniformity and proportionality as it merely transfers 
discretion from judges to United States Attorneys.192 Thus, disparities 
 
 190 Lisa M. Farabee, Disparate Departures Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Tale of 
Two Districts, 30 CONN. L. REV. 569, 573 (1998) (“Largely ignored by the [g]uidelines is the 
discretion exercised outside of the judicial branch.”). The Commission does not entirely deny 
that prosecutorial decisions foster disparities. In a 2012 report to Congress, the Commission 
acknowledges that differences in prosecutorial practices have contributed to disparities. 
BOOKER REPORT, supra note 133, app. A, at 97. Nonetheless, the report expresses that the 
Commission has insufficient information to enable it to study the extent of such disparities 
other than what it has observed with respect to prosecutorial charge bargaining with mandatory 
minimum offenses. Id. None of the agency’s recommendations for federal sentencing changes 
contained in that report implicates prosecutorial practices. 
 191 Kate Stith & Karen Dunn, A Second Chance for Sentencing Reform: Establishing a 
Sentencing Agency Within the Judicial Branch, 58 STAN. L. REV. 217, 221 (2005) (“The reality is 
that over the past two decades, sentencing authority has been transferred from judges through a 
politically weak Commission to Congress and, in the end, to prosecutors.”). 
 192 Alschuler, supra note 49, at 926 (“[T]he guidelines are bargaining weapons—armaments 
that enable prosecutors, not the [S]entencing [C]ommission, to determine sentences in most 
cases. In operation, the guidelines do not set sentences; they simply augment the power of 
prosecutors to do so.”); FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., Report of the Federal Courts Study 
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will continue to exist, but will operate more directly at the level of 
prosecutorial decisions and in pre-trial stages, rather than primarily at 
the late phase of sentencing with judicial choices.193 Incorrectly, this 
view might be interpreted as suggesting that prosecutors held little 
discretionary command—or at least less than the judiciary—preceding 
sentencing reforms, an assumption that is not evident. Prosecutors, as a 
group, possess perhaps the single greatest power in controlling 
outcomes in the criminal justice system.194 The prosecutor’s ultimate 
weapon in this system of dueling command centers may be the charging 
decision.195 This exemplifies a crucial stage, as the formal 
commencement of prosecution determines if the person will even be 
subjected to punishment. And if the prosecutor decides to file, the 
decision on exactly which crime(s) to charge sets the stage for 
bargaining, the potential applicability of a mandatory minimum, and, 
ultimately, the length of the sentence.196 Significantly, the prosecutor’s 
controlling role is amplified in that her case decisions are almost 
completely discretionary and virtually unreviewable.197 
Thus, it is probably more accurate to conclude that prosecutors 
have always possessed significant influence in terms of sentence 
outcomes. While the Sentencing Reform Act incorporated a much 
stronger appellate review of district judges’ sentencing decisions, it did 
little with respect to implementing checks on prosecutors’ choices.198 To 
the contrary, the guidelines actually have operated to further embolden 
prosecutors’ influence in several important areas. First, the guidelines 
equip prosecutors with greater ability to manipulate sentences through 
 
Committee, 2 FED. SENT’G REP. 232, 234 (1990); John Wooldredge et al., (Un)Anticipated Effects 
of Sentencing Reform on the Disparate Treatment of Defendants, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 835, 840 
(2005); but see Ricardo J. Bascuas, The American Inquisition: Sentencing After the Federal 
Guidelines, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 4 n.20 (2010) (contending guidelines reduced 
prosecutors’ discretion in plea bargaining as probation officers independently interject factual 
conclusions); Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and its Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta Period, 
91 NW. U. L. REV. 1284, 1285 (1997) (qualitative study concluding discretion not transferred to 
prosecutors based on finding that in plea negotiations prosecutors attempted to circumvent the 
guidelines in twenty percent to thirty-five percent of cases). 
 193 Lauren O’Neill Shermer & Brian D. Johnson, Criminal Prosecutions: Examining 
Prosecutorial Discretion and Charge Reductions in U.S. Federal District Courts, 27 JUST. Q. 394, 
395 (2010). 
 194 ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 5 
(2007). 
 195 Richard S. Frase, Is Guided Discretion Sufficient? Overview of the State Sentencing 
Guidelines, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L. REV. 425, 440 (2000). 
 196 Barkow, supra note 66, at 1624; Ellen S. Podgor, The Tainted Federal Prosecutor in an 
Overcriminalized Justice System, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1569, 1569–70 (2010). 
 197 DAVIS, supra note 194, at 5; see also Podgor, supra note 196, at 1585 (2010) (contending 
that the federal system “can become the subject of political whims of a prosecutor” since it 
currently “imposes few boundaries, fails to allow enforcement of internal guidelines, and has no 
legal oversight”). 
 198 Barkow, supra note 66, at 1601. 
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charge bargaining. Admittedly, before the guidelines system and its 
intended determinative sentencing structure, prosecutors were incented 
to engage in charge bargaining. The practice allows prosecutors to 
galvanize plea deals and shape their desired sentencing outcomes. Yet 
charge bargaining was likely not as dispositive to actual sentence 
outcomes prior to the guidelines. In the pre-guidelines era, agreeing to a 
lesser-included offense might have resulted in a reduction in sentence, 
but that was not at all an assured prospect. The reason is that statutory 
penalty ranges for many offenses were quite widespread.199 For example, 
before the guidelines were effective, the statutory penalties for Class D, 
C, B, and A felonies were up to six, twelve, twenty-five years, and life, 
respectively.200 These rules allowed judges wide leeway in locating a 
sentence therein. Because the numbers overlapped, the prosecutor could 
directly constrain the maximum sentence possible, but otherwise could 
not count on whether a charge bargain would convince a judge to 
invoke a lesser sentence. A plea deal would not have been dispositive of 
a lesser sentence either, as in the federal system, agreed sentence 
provisions in plea agreements are not binding on judges who reject 
them.201 The guidelines system actually altered the field of charge 
bargaining. The guidelines situate the sentencing recommendation 
within a far more discrete range, in which the calculation generally 
begins with the relevant offense(s) of conviction.202 Thus, a prosecutor 
can more fruitfully attempt to manage sentencing results in a guidelines 
system by bargaining for a crime that invokes a different starting 
guideline. 
Second, the guidelines produced a new species of fact bargaining. 
Previously this took the form of statutory offense enhancements,203 such 
as a fixed increase in punishment if the offense was also determined to 
constitute a hate crime.204 The guidelines spawned a whole different 
breed of fact bargaining, by virtue of the implementation of non-
statutory specific offense characteristics, adjustments, and departure 
provisions. These are aggravating or mitigating circumstances—i.e., 
facts—that prosecutors can trade in the plea bargaining process. With 
the guidelines, a plethora of facts are specifically relevant to increase and 
decrease sentencing recommendations. And these fact-based 
modifications reach much farther than statutory offense enhancements. 
In essence, fact bargaining here represents more a form of sentence 
 
 199 Id.  
 200 Pub. L. 98-473, Title II, § 212(a)(2), 98 Stat. 2031 (1984). 
 201 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c). 
 202 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3 (2012); but see infra text accompanying 
notes 294–309 for the relevance of real-offense sentencing. 
 203 Frank O. Bowman, III, Debacle: How the Supreme Court Has Mangled American 
Sentencing Law and How It Might Yet Be Mended, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 367, 377 (2010). 
 204 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2012). 
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bargaining than plea bargaining because the relevant facts are usually 
external to the elements of the specific offense(s) of conviction. 
Admittedly, fact bargaining is not dispositive since sentencing judges 
are not bound by stipulated facts or the absence thereof, but the deals 
are influential with them.205 
Third, local variations in prosecutors’ offices’ policies yield 
disparities, and the guidelines further fuel them. A prime example 
includes fast-track departures, which are, pursuant to the guidelines, 
permitted only in districts in which the United States Attorney’s Office 
has adopted them for specific offenses.206 By definition, defendants in 
those districts are advantaged as compared to offenders who committed 
the same offense in districts without them. Mere discrepancies in 
workload also differentially incentivize certain offices to more 
aggressively pursue plea deals, such as greater leniency on offering 
acceptance of responsibility and substantial assistance departures, to 
manage cases.207 Hence, inconsistencies may result merely to service 
prosecutors’ administrative interests. Accommodations for specific 
district problems are also relevant. Individual offices may, from time to 
time, target specified offenses that are perceived as being of particular 
concern in their area. While federal prosecutors may be reined in 
somewhat by national policy choices, they may appropriately be 
responsive to local conditions.208 Since the idea often is about crime 
control, these operations tend to rely upon heavy enforcement as well as 
attaining noticeably lengthy sentences for the crime du jour.209 Research 
has highlighted, too, that offices may have disparate policies in their 
interpretations of major guidelines and departure provisions.210 
Fourth, the guidelines offer opportunities for prosecutors to 
effectively circumvent mandatory minimums. This issue comprises both 
intended and unintended consequences. Two guidelines’ departure 
mechanisms formally endorse sentence bargaining for mandatory 
minimum offenses. One is the substantial assistance departure that 
permits a sentence below an otherwise statutorily-required minimum.211 
The other is the safety-valve adjustment that allows in limited 
 
 205 See infra Part III.B.2. 
 206 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K3.1. 
 207 Bibas, supra note 115, at 140. 
 208 Andrew B. Whitford, Bureaucratic Discretion, Agency Structure, and Democratic 
Responsiveness: The Case of the United States Attorneys, 12 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 3, 22 
(2002). 
 209 See, e.g., David E. Patton, Guns, Crime Control, and a Systemic Approach to Federal 
Sentencing, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1427, 1447–48 (2011) (discussing United States Attorney’s 
Office in Richmond, Virginia running Project Exile in the late 1990s using federal felon-in-
possession laws to combat high murder rate in the local area). 
 210 See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 115, at 148. 
 211 Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 5K1.1 (2012). 
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circumstances for a prosecutor to recommend a below-mandatory 
minimum sentence for low-level drug trafficking offenders.212 
Unintended avoidance of mandatory minimums occurs as well. The 
extent of this is unknown, but some evidence exists of creative uses 
outside of the officially sanctioned safety-valve and minor drug 
provisions.213 The Commission, for instance, has conducted special 
empirical studies in which it found evidence that charges and 
enhancements were manipulated in ways that essentially permitted the 
parties to bypass mandatory minimums for offenses involving drug 
trafficking and child pornography.214 
Fifth, the guidelines afford the prosecution virtually unilateral 
power over two additional, and important, downward departures: 
substantial assistance and fast-track departures. These two are widely 
known to be highly persuasive in influencing guilty pleas as they operate 
to reduce guidelines recommendations.215 Both require affirmative 
government motions, and determinations by the prosecution not to 
move for them are discretionary. One researcher, for example, found 
variations in policies about how liberally to grant substantial assistance 
designations among the United States Attorney’s Offices studied.216 A 
statistical analysis of the Commission’s fiscal year 2012 data files shows 
potentially improper usage of the fast-track guideline in two particular 
districts. These two districts use the fast-track guideline for a variety of 
offenses, clearly beyond those high caseload volume crimes the policy 
was designed to address.217 
Sixth, the abolition of parole permits prosecutors to control the 
length of sentences actually served through the foregoing plea, fact, and 
sentence bargaining practices. The replacement of good time credits is 
far more exacting and predictable than the prior parole system. 
 
 212 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 80001, 
108 Stat. 1796 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2012)); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 5C1.2. 
 213 Ulmer et al., supra note 108, at 582 (survey respondents estimating twenty percent of plea 
deals are intended to avoid otherwise applicable mandatory minimums). 
 214 BOOKER REPORT, supra note 133, app. A, at 97; see also Melissa Hamilton, Sentencing 
Adjudication: Lessons from Child Pornography Policy Nullification, 30 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 375, 
446 (2014) (conducting statistical analyses of Commission data, finding substantial evidence of 
charge bargaining resulting in defying mandatory minimums for child pornography crimes). 
 215 Barkow, supra note 66, at 1624. 
 216 Jeffery T. Ulmer, The Localized Uses of Federal Sentencing Guidelines in Four U.S. District 
Courts: Evidence of Processual Order, 28 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 255, 263–65 (2005). 
 217 The data indicate that outside of immigration and drugs, early disposition departures 
were granted in a handful of cases for such crimes as sexual abuse, robbery, embezzlement, 
forgery, national defense, and child pornography. Two districts were mainly responsible. 
Arizona and the Southern District of California accounted for almost all of the fast-track 
departures for offenses other than drugs and immigration. Notably, these two districts account 
together for the vast majority of fast-track departures for drugs and a majority of those for 
immigration crimes. It is possible that the use of fast-track procedures generically became 
ingrained in their cultural psyches. 
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Presumably prosecuting attorneys are cognizant that offenders, as a 
general rule, will legally be required to serve at least eighty-five percent 
of their prison sentences. This eventuality is likely factored into 
bargaining by both sides. 
Importantly, prior to the Sentencing Reform Act, the judiciary was 
considered a check on these discretionary, pre-sentence practices of 
prosecutors.218 The guidelines generally removed that counterbalance. 
Thus, federal defendants may be charged with different offenses and 
sentenced under different guidelines for similar behaviors, while others 
may be charged with the same offenses and subjected to the same 
guidelines as defendants who engaged in dissimilar behaviors.219 This 
can occur across jurisdictions based on differential prosecutors’ offices’ 
policies or amongst defendants within the same district for variations in 
individual prosecutorial decisions. 
Perhaps a supervisory authority could replace the prior judicial 
check on prosecutorial discretion. The United States Department of 
Justice’s overarching policies on the discretionary authority of 
prosecutors has changed over time in this regard. In 1993, then United 
States Attorney General Janet Reno issued a statement that indicated 
prosecutors ought to base charging and plea decisions on an 
individualized assessment of cases, including the proportionality of a 
guidelines sentence to the seriousness of the offender’s behavior.220 A 
decade later, then United States Attorney General John Ashcroft 
superseded this degree of discretion with instructions mandating that 
prosecutors charge the “most serious, readily provable” crimes in almost 
all cases.221 Some level of discretion was returned, though, in 2010 when 
United States Attorney General Eric Holder clarified that his office’s 
position was that the most serious offense remains the assumption, but 
that prosecutors in making sentencing recommendations should also 
consider whether a non-guidelines sentence better meets the statutory 
sentencing factors.222 Thus, the current policy appears to continue to 
permit some variations in judgment on the part of individual 
prosecutors, therefore inspiring inconsistencies. 
 
 218 Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1471, 
1474 (1993). 
 219 Shermer & Johnson, supra note 193, at 398. 
 220 Memorandum from Janet Reno, Att’y Gen. of the U.S., on Principles of Federal 
Prosecution to Holders of U.S. Attorney’s Manual, Title 9 (Oct. 12, 1993), reprinted in 6 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 352 (1994). 
 221 Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen. of the U.S., on Dep’t Policy Concerning 
Charging Criminal Offenses, Disposition of Charges, and Sentencing to All Federal Prosecutors 
(Sept. 22, 2003), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2003/September/03_ag_516.htm. 
 222 Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Att’y Gen. of the U.S., on Dep’t Policy on Charging 
and Sentencing to All Federal Prosecutors (May 19, 2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/oip/holder-memo-charging-sentencing.pdf. 
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Despite sentencing reforms’ purpose of reducing disparity, 
Congress failed then to circumscribe or to channel these discretionary 
prosecutorial practices.223 Nor has Congress acted on this issue since. 
The Supreme Court, in reviewing sentencing cases post-reform, has 
likewise made no significant changes to prosecutorial powers in these 
regards. While the Booker decision theoretically could have substantially 
reduced prosecutorial discretion by vesting judges with greater 
authority to police prosecutorial disparities, it is not entirely clear that 
this has occurred to any great extent. Plea deals—a practice in which 
judges in the federal system are not permitted to participate224—have 
only increased since then, and the various rewards and threats offered 
by guidelines departure standards appear to efficiently effectuate plea 
negotiation tools.225 Empirical research suggests that prosecutors have 
essentially countered the potential for Booker-led judicial oversight by 
more excessively using the foregoing guidelines-based prosecutorial 
bargaining measures as carrots and sticks.226 
One might have expected, then, that the Commission in 
promulgating the guidelines system would have foreseen that leaving 
the prosecution’s role largely unaltered, even, as indicated above, gifting 
prosecutors with greater discretionary powers, would effectively 
undermine the goal of uniformity. However, the Commission itself has 
done little in this regard. Legally, the Commission has no direct ability 
to significantly control prosecutors in terms of charging decisions or 
plea bargaining.227 Still, making little effort to ameliorate the 
opportunities prosecutors have to impact sentencing results in the 
implementation and maintenance of the guidelines system has been 
naïve. Overall, it seems a very odd system in which prosecutorial 
discretion is accepted while judicial discretion is challenged.228 Pursuant 
to the guidelines, discretion is acceptable for the party litigant yet denied 
to the independent arbiter. Nonetheless, several other sources of 
disparities exist, though they are less likely to be mentioned by 
sentencing practitioners and academics. 
 
 223 Frank O. Bowman, III, The Year of Jubilee . . . Or Maybe Not: Some Preliminary 
Observations About the Operation of the Federal Sentencing System After Booker, 43 HOUS. L. 
REV. 279, 283 (2006). 
 224 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. 
 225 Douglas A. Berman, Tweaking Booker: Advisory Guidelines in the Federal System, 43 
HOUS. L. REV. 341, 354 (2006); Melissa Hamilton, Prison-By-Default: Challenging the Federal 
Sentencing Policy’s Presumption of Incarceration, 51 HOUS. L. REV 1271 (2014). 
 226 Ulmer et al., supra note 108, at 586. 
 227 Stith & Dunn, supra note 191, at 221. 
 228 J.C. Oleson, Blowing Out All the Candles: A Few Thoughts on the Twenty-Fifth Birthday 
of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 693, 725 (2011). 
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2.     Probation Officers’ Influence 
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 operated to bequeath federal 
probation officers with a far greater participatory role in sentencing 
proceedings, and such role has transformed into a sort of supplementary 
adversarial position.229 Probation officers now possess broad discretion 
in terms of locating and documenting facts about the crime and relevant 
conduct, computing guidelines-based sentences, and in recommending 
(or not) departures.230 Probation officers often make both factual and 
legal conclusions about the defendant, the crime, relevant conduct, 
statutory applications, and guidelines interpretations, even though they 
are not required to be experienced investigators or licensed attorneys.231 
Curiously, in writing pre-sentence investigation reports, probation 
officers are not restricted to the facts or agreed sentencing elements set 
forth in any applicable plea agreement.232 Indeed, probation officers 
may develop the report and its contents, which then form the basis of 
the computed guidelines sentence, using sources and information 
outside of what is offered by, or even stipulated by, the prosecution and 
defense.233 Given such prerogative, it should not be surprising that 
studies show significant variations in how probation officers perform in 
terms of investigatory efforts and in their judgments on assessing facts 
and offenders.234 
Even at this stage, the guidelines subsidize the prosecution by 
placing defendants in a catch-22. Probation officers have been reported 
to compel defendants’ cooperation in terms of submitting to intrusive 
interviews and providing incriminating information through threats of 
withholding recommendations for the acceptance of responsibility 
reduction and/or suggesting an obstruction of justice increase; 
defendants are so pressured even though such cooperation can trigger 
relevant conduct or specific offense characteristic enhancements.235 It 
has been suggested that the guidelines system has morphed the pre-
sentence investigation into an inquisitorial exercise that is distinctly 
inclined toward determining reasons to increase sentences or otherwise 
imposing negative consequences primarily on defendants.236 
 
 229 Jerry D. Denzlinger & David E. Miller, The Federal Probation Officer: Life Before and 
After Guideline Sentencing, 55 FED. PROBATION 49, 51–52 (1991). 
 230 Bibas, supra note 115, at 145. 
 231 Bascuas, supra note 192, at 12. 
 232 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.1 (2012). 
 233 Id. § 6B1.4. 
 234 Douglas A. Berman, From Lawlessness to Too Much Law? Exploring the Risk of Disparity 
from Differences in Defense Counsel Under Guidelines Sentencing, 87 IOWA L. REV. 435, 452 
(2002) (citing studies). 
 235 Bascuas, supra note 192, at 60–61. 
 236 Id. at 65. 
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While the pre-sentence report and initial sentencing calculations 
do not carry the force of law, judges often defer to the recommendations 
of probation officers.237 In considering sentences, judges may prefer the 
pre-sentence reports’ factual assertions even if they conflict with those 
stipulated in an agreed plea deal.238 Calculations from the Commission’s 
fiscal year 2012 datafiles highlight the influence probation officers enjoy. 
Simple statistical computations indicate that while sentencing, judges in 
that year accepted the guideline factors applied in the pre-sentence 
investigation reports eighty-two percent of the time while accepting 
them with changes an additional eighteen percent of the time; judges 
did not accept the probation officers’ reports on guideline factors in less 
than two-tenths of one percent of cases. 
3.     Law Enforcement Interests 
Federal police forces retain substantial authority in choosing 
investigatory strategies that can fundamentally transform sentence 
outcomes. They can select whom to target and what crimes to 
investigate and, therefore, the makeup of the federal defendant 
population is largely dependent on law enforcement initiatives. Law 
enforcement can be politically motivated and responsive to the public’s 
concerns, which, depending on one’s perspective, can be positive or 
negative. As a result, federal officials are prone to initiating, and 
decommissioning, local task forces that specialize in investigating and 
targeting the crime du jour.239 For example, task forces set up in different 
time frames in pursuit of the drug war in the 1990s and those more 
recently developed to target child sexual exploitation offenses are 
significant contributing factors to the substantial increase in the number 
of drug offenders and child pornography defendants, respectively, 
sentenced and imprisoned in the federal system.240 In recent years, 
federal authorities refocused from drug control to pursuing weapons 
offenses and immigration violations, leading to corresponding changes 
in the number of offenders in each category sentenced (see supra Figure 
1) and in the makeup of the federal prison population (see infra Figure 
 
 237 Ulmer, supra note 216, at 266. 
 238 Id. 
 239 See Bibas, supra note 115, at 139 (“Agents and prosecutors must use their enforcement 
discretion to respond ad hoc to crises, and judges may cooperate by issuing stiffer sentences.”). 
 240 CHILD PORNOGRAPHY REPORT, supra note 188, at 63; Melissa Hamilton, The Child 
Pornography Crusade and Its Net-Widening Effect, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1679, 1689–90 (2012); 
Brad W. Smith et al., Multijurisdictional Drug Task Forces: An Analysis of Impacts, 28 J. CRIM. 
JUST. 543, 545 (2000). 
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3).241 Investigators’ discretion is also evident in the recently adopted and 
now frequent tactic of sting operations, which constitutes “the latest and 
perhaps clearest reflection of a broad shift by federal law enforcement 
away from solving crimes in favor of investigating people the 
government thinks are criminals.”242 
Law enforcement choices are not only critical to determining 
which offenders enter the system; the largely discretionary decisions 
federal agents make can directly affect sentencing. The guidelines 
system has probably only exacerbated their impact. It is quite possible 
that federal agents, understanding how the guidelines allow for a 
multitude of enhancements, can manipulate sentence outcomes prior to 
arrest. Thus, for example, the child pornography guidelines contain 
specific offense characteristics based on the number of images 
possessed, the sadistic content of the material, and trafficking material 
involving a pubescent child.243 An undercover sting operation could 
easily trigger enhanced sentencing recommendations under the 
guidelines by offering material that implicates any one or all three 
enhancements. For instance, the FBI in 2012 actually operated a child 
pornography website for two weeks244 and, therefore, presumably could 
control the distribution of content. Outside of concerns of entrapment, 
there is no legal or constitutional limitation that would prevent law 
enforcement from this type of discretionary action, which, in essence, is 
a potential source of sentencing disparity that operates at a preliminary 
stage. A similar form of sentencing manipulation seems possible for 
other crimes with sentencing enhancements easily controllable by law 
enforcement, such as sting operations involving drugs (controlling 
quantity), fraud (varying monetary amount), and weapons offenses 
(manipulating type and quantity).245 
Another source of disparity occurs as offense guidelines allegedly 
were developed with the heartland of offenders in mind. Yet, the 
“typical” offender in any crime category may change over time as 
Department of Justice priorities shift.246 The problem is that a guideline 
 
 241 NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE FEDERAL PRISON POPULATION BUILDUP: 
OVERVIEW, POLICY CHANGES, ISSUES, AND OPTIONS 9 (2013), available at 
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42937.pdf. 
 242 Brad Heath, Entrapment? But Are These Fake Drugs Stashed By the Feds “Good Law 
Enforcement” or Government Gone Too Far?, USA TODAY, June 28, 2013, at 1A, available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/06/27/atf-stash-houses-sting-usa-today-
investigation/2457109. 
 243 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2 (2012). 
 244 Levi Pulkkinen, FBI Shared Child Porn to Nab Pedophiles; Washington Home Raided, 
SEATTLEPI (May 28, 2012, 10:02 AM), http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/FBI-shared-child-
porn-to-nab-pedophiles-4552044.php. 
 245 Jeffrey L. Fisher, When Discretion Leads to Distortion: Recognizing Pre-Arrest Sentence-
Manipulation Claims Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2385, 2396 
(1996). 
 246 Paul J. Hofer, Beyond the “Heartland”: Sentencing Under the Advisory Federal Guidelines, 
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created on the assumption of the heartland of offenders may offer 
punishment that in the end is disproportionate due to an evolving 
typical base of offenders as a consequence merely of investigators’ 
choices.247 
4.     Differences in Defense Counsel Abilities 
Variable skills of defense counsel may implicate another reason for 
inconsistencies with guidelines sentences.248 Obviously, the idea that 
defense counsel competence matters is not unique to the federal system 
or to the sentencing reforms implicated herein, but the magnitude and 
complexity of the guidelines likely inordinately favors defense counsel 
with greater experience with the guidelines.249 Thus, it has been 
observed that veteran federal defenders routinely effectuate lower 
sentences compared to private defense counsel who usually have less 
familiarity with the guidelines system.250 
Another unintended consequence on a different front has 
materialized. Arming prosecutors with multiple options to impel quick 
plea deals, as discussed earlier, has had the unfortunate repercussion of 
defense counsel feeling challenged in providing effective assistance. If 
they seek to litigate issues, their clients may lose opportunities to earn 
acceptance of responsibility or substantial assistance reductions.251 The 
guidelines system and its emphasis on pleas have unexpectedly shifted 
defense counsel’s efforts and attention from trial preparation to 
bargaining at the very earliest stages of representation, which presents 
its own unique challenges in being adequately prepared with all case 
facts relevant to guidelines computations.252 
 
49 DUQ. L. REV. 675, 681 (2011). 
 247 Id. (offering, as an example, Commission admitting the money laundering guideline was 
based on a presumed normal case involving organized crime yet the new offending group 
generally has no such ties). 
 248 Bibas, supra note 115, at 144–45 (“Some districts have aggressive, knowledgeable federal 
defenders’ offices that exploit and stretch every possible loophole in the [g]uidelines for their 
clients. Other districts have overburdened, less-aggressive, or less-experienced defense lawyers 
who know less about how to exploit the [g]uidelines. Because repeat players who pool 
information are best able to exploit these complexities, federal public defenders probably 
achieve lower sentences than private lawyers who take occasional ad hoc court appointments.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 249 Margareth Etienne, Parity, Disparity, and Adversariality: First Principles of Sentencing, 58 
STAN. L. REV. 309, 320 (2005). 
 250 Bibas, supra note 115, at 144–45. 
 251 Berman, supra note 234, at 448. 
 252 Id. at 450. 
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5.     Racial Disparities 
The foregoing addressed various sources of disparities in federal 
sentencing generally, without regard to type. But any comprehensive 
discussion of the federal sentencing reforms cannot completely ignore 
the frequently expressed concern about demographic-based practices. 
When passing the sentencing guidelines reform legislation, Congress 
was also interested in combating racial discrimination. Yet again, the 
guidelines’ singular focus on honing judicial discretion fails to account 
for potentially discriminatory practices and decisions by other parts of 
the criminal justice system and within society. It is argued that local 
variations in law enforcement actions “may stem from or create racial, 
ethnic, or class disparities, as inner-city minorities may suffer heavier 
penalties than suburban whites who commit identical crimes.”253 The 
guidelines foster discrimination emanating from prosecutorial 
decisions, as well, which may serve to “discriminate against particular 
defendants or subgroups of defendants by attempting to settle like cases 
differently depending on defendants’ personal characteristics unrelated 
to culpability.”254 
The reforms actually may exacerbate inequalities among social 
groups. Mandatory minimums, particularly with drug offenses, 
disproportionately impact racial minorities and lower socioeconomic 
groups.255 The guidelines system that was created embraces factors that 
serve to heighten the likelihood of discriminatory impact, albeit likely 
unintentionally. Using criminal history as a major factor can simply 
replicate and entrench race-based practices, such as police engaging in 
racial profiling by targeting minority citizens for pretextual stops and 
consent searches.256 For example, a Commission study found that black 
drug offenders were far less likely to receive the safety valve relief to 
mandatory minimums because their criminal history score precluded 
this opportunity.257 
In sum, the guidelines system as developed was incapable of 
achieving the intended consequences of uniformity and 
 
 253 Bibas, supra note 115, at 140. 
 254 Standen, supra note 218, at 1473. 
 255 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM 
PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL SYSTEM 101–02 (2011), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/Mandatory_
Minimum_Penalties/20111031_RtC_Mandatory_Minimum.cfm. 
 256 Justin Murray, Reimagining Criminal Prosecution: Toward a Color-Conscious Professional 
Ethic for Prosecutors, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1541, 1554, 1579 (2012). 
 257 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM 
PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL SYSTEM 354 (2011), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/Mandatory_
Minimum_Penalties/20111031_RtC_Mandatory_Minimum.cfm. 
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nondiscrimination because of an erroneous disregard for the multiple 
and varied sources of sentencing disparities. The main thesis here is that 
the plan to achieve those goals was, therefore, defective as it was based 
on a flawed inference that disparities were mainly a product of judicial 
discretion. In carrying out the guidelines system, the Commission has 
not appeared to reassess holistically this heedless perspective. 
C.     Short-Term Focus 
The law of unintended consequences’ causative factor of short-
sightedness is evident in the results of federal reforms as well. Federal 
sentencing reformers have, pretty surprisingly, largely neglected to 
systemically address the reforms’ long-term costs. Curiously, the 
Commission’s efforts have been founded upon the imperious 
immediacy of interest objectives of standardization, conformity, and 
appeasing Congress’s desire for longer sentences, to the exclusion of 
future resource management. The costs that are the focus herein include 
federal prison capacity and resource issues and adjudicatory expenses. 
1.     Prison Costs 
Congress originally expressed some concern about the price tag of 
federal sentencing reforms, at least in terms related to prison population 
metrics.258 The Sentencing Reform Act has a rather weak proscription, 
directing the Commission to seek to “minimize the likelihood” that the 
federal prison population would exceed capacity.259 Of the major 
mandates the legislature enacted for the Commission, this one has 
ostensibly received the least attention in terms of any responsive action. 
Nevertheless, such negligence does not signify that the Commission has 
been unaware that the system it created would overburden the federal 
prison system. An initial prison impact analysis released in 1987 
demonstrates that the Commission was quite cognizant of the potential 
that the federal prison population was likely to increase dramatically 
after the implementation of the new guidelines system.260 Substantial 
increases would necessarily result from the cumulative impact of new 
rules, including the abolition of parole, mandatory minimums for drug 
offenses and repeat offenders, guidelines rules to significantly reduce the 
availability of probation-only sentences, and guidelines provisions that 
 
 258 18 U.S.C. § 3551 note (2012); H.R. REP. NO. 98-1017, at 37 (1984); S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 
50, 59, 67, 172–76 (1983). 
 259 28 U.S.C. § 994(g). 
 260 SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 180, at 53–67. 
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would lengthen sentences for violent offenses, burglary, and tax 
evasion.261 The report mentions that these projections indicate “future 
demands on the federal prisons will greatly exceed prison capacity.”262 
In the end, this was a quite astute prognostication. Nonetheless, there is 
little evidence that the Commission has ever sought to ameliorate these 
consequences through the strategic use of guidelines.263 
This represents a crucial observation. While some states have set 
up their sentencing commissions to energetically utilize their guidelines 
structures for continuous management of their states’ prison 
populations,264 the federal Commission has decidedly declined to accept 
that role. To the contrary, major choices adopted at the very beginning 
jumpstarted the federal prison population boom. Commission-
instituted policies discouraged probation sentences, leading to a 
dramatically decreased rate of probation sentences from over fifty 
percent to around ten percent.265 The Commission systematically 
increased presumptive sentence lengths, despite the truth-in-sentencing 
reform requiring prisoners to serve a greater percentage of their 
sentences.266 In combination, this meant that many more defendants 
would be imprisoned and for significantly longer periods of time. From 
the Commission’s perspective, a steady increase in sentence 
recommendations would likely appease Congress’s desire for a tough on 
crime stance. Statistical measures show the dramatic numerical results. 
A study by the Urban Institute compared sentencing data in 1986, the 
year before the guidelines took effect, with 1997, noting that 
imposed prison terms increased from 39 months to 54 months. 
Further, during this period, the proportion of the imposed 
prison term that offenders could expect to serve increased from 
59% to 87%. The time offenders entering [f]ederal prison could 
expect to serve increased from about 21 months, on average, 
during 1986 to about 47 months during 1997.267 
 
 261 Id. at 53. 
 262 Id. at 64. 
 263 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SENTENCING OPTIONS UNDER THE GUIDELINES 9 (2007), 
available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research/Working_Group_Reports/Simplification/
SENTOPT. PDF (“The U.S. Sentencing Commission has not attempted to use the guidelines to 
reduce prison population growth.”). 
 264 Barkow, supra note 66, at 1603. 
 265 Nancy J. Gertner, Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A View from the Bench, HUM. RTS. 
MAG., Spring 2002, at 6, 7. 
 266 Hamilton, supra note 225. 
 267 WILLIAM J. SABOL & JOHN MCGREADY, TIME SERVED IN PRISONS BY FEDERAL 
OFFENDERS, 1986–97 (1999), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/ascii/tspfo97.txt. 
“About 60% of this increase can be attributed to the increase in time to be served by new court 
commitments; 25%, to the increase in the number of suspects investigated by U.S. attorneys; 
and 15%, to the increase in the proportion of offenders sentenced to prison. Decreases in the 
prosecution rate and in time served by supervision violators curtailed the growth of the prison 
population.” Id. 
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The Commission also seemingly neglected the fact that at the time 
of sentencing reforms, the Federal Bureau of Prisons already operated 
over capacity, and it has ever since.268 In recent years, overcrowding in 
all facilities has ranged from twenty-two percent in fiscal year 1997 to an 
overall high of forty-one percent in 2004.269 Capacity issues, though, 
vary by type of facility. The most current estimate in 2013 is that the 
Federal Bureau of Prison is operating at thirty-seven to fifty-four 
percent over capacity, depending on the security level.270 The situation 
would be worse if the Bureau was not outsourcing almost twenty 
percent of its population.271 
As a consequence of these policies, the federal prison population 
has exploded. Using Bureau of Justice Statistics data, Figure 3 shows the 
trend in the federal prison population for sentenced offenders over time 
and by major offense type. 
Figure 3272 
 
 
 268 NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE FEDERAL PRISON POPULATION BUILDUP: 
OVERVIEW, POLICY CHANGES, ISSUES, AND OPTIONS 21 fig.10 (2013), available at 
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42937.pdf . 
 269 Id. at 22 tbl.2. 
 270 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY2014 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET: BUILDINGS AND FACILITIES 1 
(2013), available at www.justice.gov/jmd/2014justification/pdf/bop-bf-justification.pdf . 
 271 Id. at 5 (involving privately operated facilities, state and locally managed facilities, 
residential reentry centers, and home-based confinement). 
 272 Data compiled from Federal Criminal Case Proceeding Statistics, supra note 95.  
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Together with non-sentenced inmates (such as pre-trial detainees, 
civil committees, and District of Columbia prisoners), the total federal 
prison population in both public and private facilities numbered over 
216,000 in June 2014.273 As a result of increasing admissions, as well as 
inflation, appropriations to the Federal Bureau of Prisons has also 
grown exponentially since the pre-reform era, as shown in Figure 4. 
Figure 4274 
 
The Commission’s entrenchment, with its laser focus on guidelines 
compliance, has yielded further unintended consequences for the prison 
system. A 2012 report by the GAO found: “[T]he growth of the federal 
inmate population and related crowding have negatively affected 
inmates housed in [federal prison] institutions, institutional staff, and 
the infrastructure of [federal] facilities, and have contributed to inmate 
misconduct, which affects staff and inmate security and safety.”275 The 
report designates the length of prison sentences as “one of the single 
 
 273 Population Statistics, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, http://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/
population_statistics.jsp (last visited June 7, 2014). 
 274 Data compiled from NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE BUREAU OF PRISONS 
(BOP): OPERATIONS AND BUDGET 11–12 (2013), available at https://www.hsdl.org/
?view&did=739496. 
 275 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO 12-743, BUREAU OF PRISONS: GROWING INMATE 
CROWDING NEGATIVELY AFFECTS INMATES, STAFF, AND INFRASTRUCTURE 18 (2012), available 
at http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648123. pdf. 
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most important factors in prison population growth.”276 The situation is 
expected to worsen. The Bureau of Prisons estimates an additional 
fifteen percent population increase by the year 2020.277 
Oddly, the Commission, then and now, seems intent on sentencing 
inflation. The agency consistently increases sentencing ranges.278 To its 
merit, the Commission admits this reality, yet remains unapologetic. 
Instead, agency officials in 2004 rationalized that “Congress has proven 
willing to appropriate the funds needed to expand the capacity of the 
federal prisons to the levels needed to accommodate expanded federal 
prosecution and increased sentence severity.”279 Then in 2012, in 
response to a Congressional hearing expressly enquiring about the 
rising costs of federal imprisonment, the Chair of the Commission 
appeared to assume little blame. She principally explained overcrowding 
by pointing to mandatory minimums and the size and composition of 
the federal criminal docket.280 While she asked Congress to consider 
enacting specific statutes that would offer some sentencing relief, no 
corresponding changes to the guidelines were offered.281 
2.     Increases in Adjudication Costs 
The guidelines system actually has become quite inefficient in its 
tremendous consumption of resources. Some costs are unquantifiable, 
but there is substantial evidence that the guidelines system has caused 
interruptions and alterations in criminal adjudication. Mastering the 
guidelines manual itself must be an intensive exercise for anyone. 
Coupled with annual guidelines modifications and keeping track of 
various judicial interpretations of guidelines operations, expertise in 
guidelines compliance likely is time consuming. Probation officers 
spend more time than in the indeterminate system specifically 
addressing sentencing matters.282 The guidelines system still requires 
lengthy pre-sentence investigation reports,283 but attention to detail is 
greater considering specific facts can trigger various specific offense 
 
 276 Id. at 48. 
 277 Id. at 12. 
 278 Oleson, supra note 228, at 712. 
 279 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING 77 (2004), 
available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-
projects-and-surveys/miscellaneous/15-year-study/15_year_study_full.pdf. 
 280 Letter from Patti Saris, Chair, U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, to Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, House 
Judiciary Comm., and Charles Grassley, Member, House Judiciary Comm. (Aug. 7, 2012), 
available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_
and_Reports/Submissions/20120807_StC_Prison_Costs. pdf. 
 281 Id. 
 282 Denzlinger & Miller, supra note 229, at 51. 
 283 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c). 
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characteristics and other adjustments. Practitioners note that guidelines 
compliance is resource intensive for them, too.284 Judges seem to agree. 
A survey of federal judges shortly after the implementation of the 
guidelines showed that ninety percent of respondents opined that 
sentencing procedures had become more protracted.285 One reason is 
that judges must spend more time ruling on the existence of specific 
facts to support the complex guidelines calculations.286 
Experience has also proven that the guidelines are not easily 
interpretable and battles over them have left district courts litigating a 
wide variety of issues.287 Guidelines complexity, interpretive issues, and 
constitutional questions have burdened the federal judicial system.288 
There has also been an impact on the federal appellate docket.289 The 
fact that the United States Supreme Court has had to weigh in on issues 
with the guidelines in dozens of cases attests to the capital outlays the 
system has wrought.290 Litigation over sentencing has burdened the 
caseloads of the federal circuit courts of appeal. Prior to the institution 
of the guidelines system in 1987, sentences were virtually 
unappealable.291 The Sentencing Reform Act opened the door, 
permitting either party to appeal the sentence issued. The parties have 
realized this opportunity. The number of appeals has skyrocketed, with 
the majority filed by defendants. The number of appeals with sentencing 
issues has evolved from a rarity pre-reform, to approximately 4000 
sentencing appeals in fiscal year 1996 (seventeen percent of which were 
reversed or remanded)292 and increasing another fifty percent to almost 
6000 in fiscal year 2012 (of which twenty-seven percent were reversed or 
remanded).293 
While not directly a cost of adjudication, the increased expenses for 
the operation of the Commission, an agency situated in the judicial 
 
 284 Etienne, supra note 249, at 320–21. 
 285 FEDERAO COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 
137 (1990), available at www.fjc.gov/public/pdf. nsf/lookup/repfcsc. pdf/$file/repfcsc. pdf. 
 286 Susan N. Herman, Federal Criminal Litigation in 20/20 Vision, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
461, 470 (2009). 
 287 Berman, supra note 234, at 443. 
 288 William K. Sessions III, Federal Sentencing Policy: Changes Since the Sentencing Reform 
Act of 1984 and the Evolving Role of the United States Sentencing Commission, 2012 WIS. L. 
REV. 85, 107. 
 289 Herman, supra note 286, at 470. 
 290 See OFF. GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SELECTED SUPREME COURT CASES 
ON SENTENCING ISSUES (2014), available at www.ussc.gov/Legal/Court_Decisions/
Supreme_Court_Cases. pdf (collecting cases). 
 291 Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96 (1996) (noting the exception of sentences violating 
statutory limits). 
 292 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 1996 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 
fig.V (1997), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_
Sourcebooks/1996/FigV.pdf. 
 293 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 102, at fig.M. 
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branch, is still relevant. The budget for the Commission’s own tasks in 
promulgating, continually monitoring, and amending the guidelines has 
doubled over a fifteen-year period, rising from $8.5 million for fiscal 
year 1997 to $16.5 million in fiscal year 2012. 
D.     Competing Basic Values 
This Part on several occasions has highlighted the unanticipated 
consequence of sentencing reforms in the federal system of likely 
furthering disparities in sentencing nationwide. An additional source of 
this unintended consequence is partly the fault of an initial—and 
controversial—policy decision made by the Commission. The relevant 
policy here relates to what is generally referred to as real-offense 
sentencing.294 The Commission’s basic choice was whether to embrace a 
charge system, one in which the sentence was proportional to the 
offense(s) of conviction, or a real-offense system, one in which the 
sentence also takes into consideration the defendant’s actual conduct. 
The latter system prevailed.295 The Commission’s real-offense system 
permits the sentencer to consider facts outside the four corners of the 
charge sheet for which the defendant is sentenced. Thus, the sentencer 
can consider other relevant characteristics of the offense, offender, or 
victim and can evaluate the defendant’s alleged other crimes.296 These 
have been, appropriately, referred to as extra-verdict facts, which are 
still factored into the sentence outcome.297 The Commission authorizes 
the consideration of additional offenses even if the prosecutor never 
brought charges for such conduct, the charges were dismissed, or the 
defendant was acquitted of them.298 The scheme countenances such 
consideration even if the relevant conduct was bargained out of the plea 
deal.299 In essence, at the sentencing hearing the parties may be litigating 
the existence of facts that were not necessary elements of the crime(s) 
for which the defendant was convicted.300 
A hypothetical may help illustrate the gravity of a real-offense 
system. Suppose the defendant is prosecuted for four bank robberies. 
 
 294 David Yellen, Reforming the Federal Sentencing Guidelines’ Misguided Approach to Real-
Offense Sentencing, 58 STAN. L. REV. 267, 268 (2005) (contending a “radical” policy). 
 295 Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 
80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 926 (1990). 
 296 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3 (2012). 
 297 Benjamin J. Priester, Apprendi Land Becomes Bizarro World: “Policy Nullification” and 
Other Surreal Doctrines in the New Constitutional Law of Sentencing, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
1, 8 (2011). 
 298 David Yellen, Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice: Real Offense Sentencing and the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, 78 MINN. L. REV. 403, 403 (1993). 
 299 Nagel, supra note 295, at 925 n.228. 
 300 Bowman, supra note 203, at 379. 
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The defendant goes to trial and the jury convicts on a single bank 
robbery and acquits on the others. At sentencing, though, the district 
judge can consider evidence of the three acquitted bank robberies and of 
additional facts not charged or found to be true by the jury, such as the 
use of a deadly weapon and the defendant’s aggravating role in all four 
charged crimes. 
The real-offense system was apparently an accommodation to gaps 
in federal criminal law.301 Supporters argue that real-offense sentencing 
is appropriate considering the failure of the federal criminal code itself 
to differentiate between culpable offenses in many statutes.302 For 
instance, envisage the federal crime of wire fraud. It is generically 
defined to include: 
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or 
artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by 
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or 
promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of 
wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or 
foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or 
sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or 
artifice . . . .303 
The penalty for wire fraud is up to twenty years in prison.304 On its own, 
there is no distinguishing the culpability between the worst and least 
offenders of the crime of wire fraud. There is no statutory distinction 
between the nature of the fraud, type of victim, extent of fear instilled, 
amount of loss, or duration of the crime, all of which are likely relevant 
considerations for assessments of culpability. Yet the fact that the 
potential range of punishment is so broad suggests even Congress 
expected there would be various degrees of seriousness in committing 
the offense of wire fraud. 
Thus, supporters claim that in order to comply with the goal of 
punishment proportionate to the behavior, real-offense sentencing 
offers a method for gradating levels of moral responsibility and harm.305 
A real-offense system allows the sentencing authority to systematically 
incorporate offense characteristics as discrete quantifiable units of 
culpability to distinguish dissimilar crimes. Critics, on the other hand, 
claim that real-offense sentencing is fundamentally unfair for reaching 
conduct external to the offense(s) of conviction.306 Real-offense 
 
 301 Breyer, supra note 176, at 8–9. 
 302 Julie R. O’Sullivan, In Defense of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines’ Modified Real-Offense 
System, 91 NW. U.L. REV. 1342, 1345 (1997). 
 303 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012). 
 304 Id. 
 305 O’Sullivan, supra note 302, at 1345. 
 306 Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Facts: Travesties of Real-Offense Sentencing, 45 STAN. L. REV. 
523, 524 (1993). 
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sentencing occurs in proceedings without the normal procedural 
safeguards afforded during the guilt phase, such as a jury determination 
of the facts, the right to confront witnesses, and the requisite standard of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.307 Objectors contend that real-offense 
sentencing merely subsidizes the prosecution’s case,308 while 
contrastingly disadvantaging the defendant’s position. 
Real-offense sentencing has led to additional unintended 
consequences in further handicapping defendants. Defendants may be 
discouraged from even challenging real-offense evidence upon threat of 
losing an opportunity to receive reductions for acceptance of 
responsibility. They also face aggravating obstruction of justice points if 
denying relevant conduct is determined to be thwarting the 
investigation.309 
In sum, real-offense sentencing represents a tradeoff between 
competing values. The real-offense system represents an elevation of the 
goal of proportionality (for this purpose at the individual level measured 
by real-offense behavior) over traditional procedural interests. 
Efficiency is sacrificed to calculability, as well. Previously addressed was 
the idea that sentencing reform has led to the unintended consequence 
of substantially increasing adjudication costs. The minutiae of 
quantifications of harm represented by the system undermine efficiency, 
too. The guidelines system is widely criticized as being extremely 
complicated.310 The most recent guidelines manual is over 500 pages 
long, excluding most appendices. It contains thousands of rules. A 
perusal of guidelines makes evident that there are numerous exceptions 
to rules, exceptions to exceptions, and sheer anomalies. A commentator 
has remarked that the guidelines comprise the most circuitous 
mathematical word problem known in criminal law.311 Compliance 
often requires numerous calculations and the guidelines’ frequent use of 
cross-references may require a journey through many different 
guidelines even in cases comprising a single count of conviction.312 
Another fundamental value has been forfeited and deserves at least 
brief mention. The guidelines favor metrics over providing guiding 
principles that would prove useful for judicial decision-making. While it 
certainly has authored a plethora of complex rules under the guise of 
providing systematic structure, the high variance rate alone indicates the 
 
 307 Susan N. Herman, The Tail That Wagged the Dog: Bifurcated Fact-Finding Under the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Limits of Due Process, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 289, 290–91 
(1992). 
 308 Etienne, supra note 249, at 316. 
 309 Id. at 320. 
 310 Yellen, supra note 294, at 272. 
 311 Porter, supra note 76, at 479. 
 312 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.5 (2012). 
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Commission is often not providing normative guidance.313 By 
emphasizing the value of reducing disparity, the Commission has 
resorted to quantification rather than consistently employing its 
expertise in criminology. As one commentator has suggested, the 
Commission gave judges “words on a page, categories, grids, numbers” 
but no coherent sentencing policies to guide uniform and just 
decisions.314 This reality, though, is certainly consistent with 
characteristics of McSentencing. 
E.     Self-Fulfilling Prophecies 
As has been addressed, sentencing reforms were based on 
assumptions of disparities in sentencing and disproportionate 
punishments.315 But these goals can properly be perceived as self-
fulfilling prophecies. According to Robert Merton’s theory here, these 
presumptions may have been initially fallacious anxieties, which have 
transformed into their actual existence. Let us start with the self-
fulfilling prophecy of disparities. 
1.     Disparities 
Whether disparities in sentencing truly existed at the time of the 
sentencing reform legislation is uncertain. By characterizing judicial 
sentencing discretion as necessarily causing disparities, sentencing 
reformers certainly signaled their strong desire to find evidence thereof. 
Legal practitioners, academics, and empirical researchers have 
attempted to answer the question about whether disparity has increased 
or decreased over time, or at least whether there is disparity at all since 
the guidelines reform. But despite much research there is no definitive 
answer.316 Research results point in many different directions and 
provide disparate findings. Likely this is due to inconsistent 
methodologies,317 variables,318 sources of data,319 jurisdictions,320 time 
 
 313 Stith & Dunn, supra note 191, at 218. 
 314 Nancy Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence: American Judges and Sentencing, 4 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 523, 535 (2007). 
 315 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING 
COMMISSION 1, available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/about/overview/
USSC_Overview.pdf.  
 316 Leslie Sebba, Is Sentencing Reform a Lost Cause? A Historical Perspective on Conceptual 
Problems in Sentencing Research, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 237, 257–58 (2013). 
 317 Caleb Mason & David Bjerk, Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity on the Federal Bench: An 
Examination of Drug Smuggling Cases in the Southern District of California, 25 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 190, 195 (2013) (reviewing PACER information, comparing sentences from 2007–2010 for 
drug smuggling cases issued in a single district, finding “a good deal of uniformity”). 
 318 Joel Waldfogel, Aggregate Inter-Judge Disparity in Federal Sentencing: Evidence from 
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frames,321 offenses,322 and focal point of attention (race,323 gender,324 or 
sentence length325). 
It is as if there is some metaphysical disparity that is at the heart of 
the debate, amorphous as it is. Nonetheless, whether the “truth” of 
disparity at sentencing reform was accurate or not is not dispositive of 
the self-fulfilling prophecy at issue. We can simply concede that 
disparities existed at the time of reforms while also recognizing that the 
sentencing reformers’ labeling of judicial discretion in sentencing as 
incapable of achieving uniformity may have inadvertently caused 
further inconsistencies in judicial decisions and fostered additional 
sources of disparity. A jurist has observed, for example, that the 
automated guidelines left colleagues in his district less likely than before 
reforms to confer with each other to foster uniformity.326 Alternative 
sources of disparities include guidelines policies discussed earlier which 
 
Three Districts (D.Ct., S.D.N.Y., N.D. Cal.), 4 FED. SENT’G REP. 151, 152 (1991) (examining 
three districts and finding greater aggregate disparity in the transitional period after the 
guidelines than before in two of the three). 
 319 Susan B. Long & David Burnham, Examining Current Federal Sentencing Practices: A 
National Study of Differences Among Judges, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 6, 15 (2012) (analyzing TRAC 
data for 2007–2011, finding “statistically significant, unexplained differences in the typical 
sentences of judges in around 60 percent of [federal] courthouses, while the remaining 40 
percent showed no significant differences”). 
 320 Ann Martin Stacey & Cassia Spohn, Gender and the Social Costs of Sentencing: An 
Analysis of Sentences Imposed on Male and Female Offenders in Three U.S. District Courts, 11 
BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 43, 46 (2006) (analyzing file data from three federal courts 1998–2000, 
finding preferential treatment of female drug defendants). 
 321 DOUGLAS C. MCDONALD & KENNETH E. CARLSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SENTENCING 
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: DOES RACE MATTER?: THE TRANSITION TO SENTENCING GUIDELINES, 
1986–90, at 1–2 (1993), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/App/abstractdb/
AbstractDBDetails.aspx?id=145332 (finding racial differences in drug offending after reforms 
but not before and citing the impact of guidelines and mandatory minimums). 
 322 Celesta A. Albonetti, Sentencing Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Effects of 
Defendant Characteristics, Guilty Pleas, and Departures on Sentencing Outcomes for Drug 
Offenses, 1991–1992, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 789, 817 (1997) (examining drug offenses and 
finding sentences based on offense-related variables, as well as on ethnicity, gender, education, 
and citizenship). 
 323 Joshua B. Fischman & Max M. Schanzenbach, Racial Disparities Under the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines: The Role of Judicial Discretion and Mandatory Minimums, 9 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 729 (2012) (using Commission data from 1992–2009 to conclude that 
judicial discretion can reduce racial disparities and any residual differences in sentence length 
and departures based on race were largely the result of mandatory minimums). 
 324 David R. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence from 
the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J.L. & ECON. 285, 308 (2001) (finding blacks, males, and offenders of 
lower socioeconomic class on average receive longer sentences in fiscal years 1991–1994, 
controlling for relevant factors, due mostly to departure decisions). 
 325 Celesta A. Albonetti, The Joint Conditioning Effect of Defendant’s Gender and Ethnicity 
on Length of Imprisonment Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Drug 
Trafficking/Manufacturing Offenders, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 39, 48–55 (2002) (reporting 
univariate statistics for drug trafficking: black males received the longest mean sentence length 
while white and Hispanic females received the shortest). 
 326 Jack B. Weinstein, A Trial Judge’s Second Impression of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 
66 S. CAL. L. REV. 357, 363–64 (1992). 
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arm prosecutors with greater discretionary judgment, provide probation 
officers with authoritative influence, enable police forces to manipulate 
sentencing factors through investigative strategies, and favor defense 
counsel having familiarity with the complex guidelines.327 In demanding 
uniformity, the guidelines has unwittingly fostered resentment and 
criticism, while at the same time in trying to reduce disparity, the 
guideline system has likely managed to merely exacerbate it. 
Concentration of reforms on restricting judicial flexibility in 
decision-making is particularly relevant here, eliciting felicitous 
reflections upon the salience of cultural values. Neither Congress nor 
the Commission adequately considered the strong cultural traditions of 
judicial discretion, independence, and prerogative.328 These traditions 
are especially robust in the area of sentencing. American judges, 
consistent with common law conventions, heartily believe in their 
primordial abilities to adjudge proper punishments.329 In contrast, 
Congress and the Commission seemed to genuinely trust that a mass 
overhaul of judicial sentimentalities, imaginations, and capacities could 
instantly occur through legislative and administrative fiat. Social forces 
dictated otherwise. Prophecies that judicial discretion was the source of 
disparities fostered institutional distrust.330 Congress and the 
Commission, made different ideological assumptions than the federal 
judiciary about how best to achieve sentencing uniformity and 
proportionality. For Congress and the Commission, these goals could be 
achieved through standardized mass sentencing rules and strict limits 
on judicial discretion.331 For the judiciary, individualized justice remains 
the preferred method, and these values are best achieved with reliance 
upon judges’ intelligence, experience, and good judgment.332 
Attempts to restrict judicial discretion become a self-fulfilling 
prophecy considering the nature of judging in that it is figuratively an 
 
 327 See supra Part III.B. 
 328 See Michael Edmund O’Neill & Linda Drazga Maxfield, Judicial Perspectives on the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Goals of Sentencing: Debunking the Myths, 56 ALA. L. 
REV. 85, 85 (2004). 
 329 Gertner, supra note 314, at 524. 
 330 Osler, supra note 74, at 217 (“[A] sad result has been the continuing and destabilizing 
struggle between judges, the Sentencing Commission, and Congress, which has been fought like 
a tug of war with the rope being dragged first towards uniformity, then towards judicial 
discretion, and then back again in a pit of mud.”). 
 331 Hofer, supra note 246, at 681. 
 332 See Bowman, supra note 203, at 373–74 (“Some conceived of sentencing judges as 
performing a quasi-medical evaluation and treatment function. Others maintained that 
sentencing judges were performing a sui generis form of ‘moral reasoning’ that could not be 
cabined within the fact-and-rule-bound strictures of adversarial due process. After all, one 
would scarcely insist on due process in the doctor’s examining room or the tower of the 
philosopher-king.” (footnotes omitted)); Gertner, supra note 314, at 527 (referring to 
sentencing judge’s role as “therapeutic, much like a physician” such that limiting access to 
information on which to build a sentence becomes unreasonable). 
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invitation for insurrection.333 As a federal judge opines: “The 
[g]uidelines . . . have made charlatans and dissemblers of us all. We 
spend our time plotting and scheming, bending and twisting, distorting 
and ignoring the law in an effort to achieve a just result. All under the 
banner of ‘truth in sentencing’!”334 The institutions, operating on a 
fundamental level of distrust, have become alienated within 
McSentencing.335 These institutions are so entrenched in such mistrust 
of each other on sentencing issues that a power struggle has ensued, 
which inherently undermines the goals of reforms. The judiciary’s 
position is evident by the high variance rate. For fiscal year 2012, only 
fifty-two percent of sentences were within guidelines ranges.336 The level 
of dissension reverberated at a Congressional hearing held in 2011 
specifically called to address the current state of affairs with federal 
sentencing. Pointedly titled “Uncertain Justice,” the hearing appeared to 
have been intended to provide a public forum to chastise the judiciary 
for its high rates of variances and the Commission for not reining them 
in. On behalf of the House Judiciary Committee, the then Chair of the 
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security acerbically 
claimed that the federal judiciary had since Booker “wrested back most if 
not all of the old discretion [f]ederal judges used to have—a discretion 
that Congress found was abused in 1984 when it passed the sentencing 
guidelines law.”337 He further rhetorically surmised that the 
Commission appears “satisfied that the regulations they promulgate can 
be routinely ignored.”338 
For its part, the Commission struggles with its attempt at oversight 
since the agency does not enjoy direct managerial control of the federal 
judiciary. Therefore, it has petitioned for backup from two other 
institutions that wield some authority over decisions at the district court 
 
 333 Osler, supra note 74, at 218. 
 334 Weinstein, supra note 326, at 364–65 (quoting a survey respondent) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 335 Stith & Dunn, supra note 191, at 220 (“[T]he current Commission bears the taint of 
longstanding and widespread disrespect for its own [g]uidelines. This lack of respect is 
especially evident in Congress itself, which increasingly has rejected a role for the Sentencing 
Commission in formulating federal sentencing policy.” (footnote omitted)); Ronald F. Wright, 
The Power of Bureaucracy in the Response to Blakely and Booker, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 389, 391, 
403 (2006) (“Congress’s view of the Commission falls somewhere between indifference and 
hostility . . . .”). 
 336 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 102, at tbl.N. Approximately twenty-eight percent were 
government-sponsored below range, eighteen percent represented judicial downward 
departures, while a final two percent were above range. Id. 
 337 Uncertain Justice: The Status of Federal Sentencing and the U.S. Sentencing Commission 
Six Years After U.S. v. Booker: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and 
Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 2 (2011) (statement of F. James 
Sensenbrenner, Chairman, Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec.), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/112th/112-142_70669.pdf. 
 338 Id. 
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level: Congress and the federal appellate courts. In a lengthy report to 
Congress in 2012, the Commission implored Congress to assist it in 
wresting back significant control after the Booker decision. The 
administrative agency makes specific entreaties. The Commission 
recommended that Congress require that federal judges give the 
guidelines “substantial weight,”339 thereby putting a thumb on the scale 
favoring guidelines-computed numbers. It asked that Congress require 
district judges to give even more justification than normally required 
when issuing a sentence outside the applicable guidelines range,340 
suggesting any variance should be deemed inherently suspect. In 
another clear bid for making the guidelines more salient and to 
encourage compliance, the Commission sought the assistance of the 
federal appellate courts, asking for a “more robust” appellate review 
standard.341 At present, these entreaties remain outstanding, with no 
public response yet by the legislature or the federal courts of appeal. 
Nonetheless, they are signifiers of the disconnect between institutions 
and that the judiciary’s strong reactions to the reform legislation 
undermines its success. 
A potential reason for the high judicial variance rate regards the 
dehumanization aspect of McSentencing. Scoring systems that 
mechanize decision-making, while restricting freedom of thought, are 
inherently demoralizing to professionals. While guidelines calculations 
have not (yet) replaced human labor with technology driven devices,342 
the vast array of guidelines and required computations still undermine 
human ingenuity and solicitude in the sentencing equation. The 
sentencing reforms intend to exchange the intellectual and emotional 
largely with number crunching. The system is uniquely dehumanizing 
to judges, who naturally want to feel that they have made a proper effort 
and given thoughtful consideration before substantially infringing upon 
a person’s liberty interest.343 According to the estimable Judge Jack 
Weinstein: “Whereas sentencing once called for hours spent reflecting 
on the offense and the person, we judges are becoming rubber-stamp 
bureaucrats. When we come to see ourselves as judicial accountants, 
freed from the awful responsibility of imposing a sentence, we will have 
abdicated our judicial role entirely.”344 McSentencing is dehumanizing 
 
 339 BOOKER REPORT, supra note 133, pt. A, at 114 (suggesting alternatives of “due regard” 
and “respectful consideration”). 
 340 Id. at 112. 
 341 Id. at 111–12. 
 342 But see Osler, supra note 74, at 232–33 (suggesting a computer program with databases of 
federal sentencing practices could assist judicial decisions). 
 343 Denny Chin, Sentencing: A Role for Empathy, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1561, 1581 (2012); Jack 
B. Weinstein, Does Religion Have a Role in Criminal Sentencing?, 23 TOURO L. REV. 539, 539 
(2007). 
 344 Weinstein, supra note 326, at 364. 
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to defendants as well. In the course of the intended mass sentencing 
system, offenders are seen as belonging to a type and not as individuals. 
In the end, the thesis presented herein is that the prophecy of 
mechanized sentencing achieving uniformity created a culture of 
nonconformance with the guidelines. The Commission seems to regard 
uniformity as meaning sameness in punishment for similar conduct. 
This ignores another cultural reality leading to irrationality. In the last 
century or so, we as a society, when faced with concrete examples, have 
tended to balk at assuming a one-size-fits-all philosophy, even for 
offenses causing the same harm.345 A few examples may suffice. Many 
states have codified degrees of murder mostly to be able to gradate 
punishments, even though an identical harm results—i.e., death of a 
person. The death penalty has been, albeit led by Supreme Court 
doctrine, limited to the worst of the worst murderers,346 and defining 
such is left to human judgment in individual cases. Our system of 
criminal law has developed a range of defenses, whether full or partial, 
because of the presence of certain personal attributes (e.g., infancy, 
insanity, diminished capacity) or situational circumstances (e.g., self-
defense, necessity, duress) that alter our social perspective on culpability 
and/or desire for public condemnation. In other words, strict 
uniformity disregards our natural tendency to make value-laden 
judgments that are context dependent. To cite a challenging 
contemporary example, the distribution of child pornography has in 
recent years been decried as an extremely heinous offense with 
offenders being morally condemned and, at least in the federal system, 
subject to increasingly lengthy sentences.347 But with the recent 
occurrences of teenagers “sexting,” the public’s moral compass has been 
severely tested. Indeed, the commonality of such behavior348 and with 
the general view that it may represent relatively innocent social 
escapades among immature youngsters (or at least not rising to the level 
of horror evoked by adult men with sexually explicit photos of young 
children) has caused state and local officials in various parts of the 
 
 345 Gertner, supra note 314, at 538. 
 346 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 440 (2008). 
 347 See generally Hamilton, supra note 240; Melissa Hamilton, The Efficacy of Severe Child 
Pornography Sentencing: Empirical Validity or Political Rhetoric?, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 545 
(2011). 
 348 NAT’L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN & UNPLANNED PREGNANCY, SEX AND TECH: 
RESULTS FROM A SURVEY OF TEENS AND YOUNG ADULTS 1 (2008), available at 
http://thenationalcampaign.org/sites/default/files/resource-primary-download/sex_and_tech_
summary.pdf (estimating twenty-two percent of teenage girls and eighteen percent of teenage 
boys in America had self-produced and distributed pornographic material by using technology 
to post nude or semi-nude photos of themselves). 
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country to create specialized laws to exempt or reduce punishment for 
young offenders.349 
The final result is that sentencing reform, by declaring that judicial 
discretion caused disparities, is a quintessential self-fulfilling prophecy 
in which reactive forces ensured that near uniformity would not be 
achieved. Judges are by nature resistant to cooptation of their 
professional and ethical duties. The actions of Congress and the 
Commission unintentionally reinforced judicial discretion, both birthed 
and augmented discretionary abilities in other sectors, and precipitated 
social reactions in the form of end-runs around the system. 
2.     Proportionality 
The extreme focus in the last thirty years on uniformity has left 
proportionality a definitively subordinated goal. Yet its importance in 
any system of punishment should not be underestimated. A simple rule 
requiring life sentences for all offenders would be uniform but would be 
disproportionate for the vast majority of offenders, and therefore would 
be unreasonable in many cases. Achieving proportionality was a self-
defeating prophecy with the reform legislation and choices by the 
Commission. Here, we are concerned with systemic proportionality. 
With the refusal by Congress and the Commission to recalibrate the 
ranking of federal crimes and reimagine relative sentences, it is no 
wonder that the ideal of a proportional system could not be achieved. 
Indeed, the inaugural Commission rebelled at the instruction. A goal 
necessarily becomes self-defeating when the people required to act 
refuse to do so. 
Again, a disconnect exists amongst the relevant institutions about 
whether the guidelines offer sentences that are too severe or too lenient. 
At the time of the sentencing reforms, while there was not consistent 
agreement among the Congressmen who pushed for guidelines, there 
was a strong contingency of legislatures who believed sentences were 
too lenient.350 Since then, the guidelines have taken on a consistent tone, 
in what a sentencing expert has described as a “one-way upward 
ratchet” in increasing sentencing recommendations.351 In contrast, the 
judiciary tends, though not universally, to consider the guidelines as 
offering unreasonably harsh punishments.352 Thus, in fiscal year 2012, 
district judges issued below guidelines sentences in forty-six percent of 
 
 349 See generally Jordan J. Szymialis, Note, Sexting: A Response to Prosecuting Those Growing 
up with a Growing Trend, 44 IND. L. REV. 302 (2010). 
 350 STITH & CABRANES, supra note 132, at 38–48. 
 351 Frank O. Bowman, III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Structural 
Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1319–20 (2005). 
 352 Sessions, supra note 288, at 92. 
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cases.353 This situation is reminiscent of one of the major 
enlightenments underlying the law of unintended consequences: 
Purposive action, particularly that in the form of exceptional legislation, 
exists in a social world and will likely confront obstinacy, obstacles, and 
reprisal. 
CONCLUSION 
Congress embraced the potential to achieve lofty goals when it 
enacted federal sentencing reforms in the 1980s. Uniformity in 
sentencing practices and proportionality were main attractions of the 
reform legislation. What resulted was the creation of a federal 
punishment system reliant upon a mechanized system of assembly-line 
justice. But the reforms confronted the social world of the federal 
judiciary in which sentencing is not accepted as a mere numbers game 
and the concept of McSentencing is a horrifying prospect to many. 
McSentencing offers the benefits of predictability, calculability, 
efficiency, and control. On the other hand, it is also depersonalizing. 
The reforms begot unintended consequences as a result of insufficient 
planning, failure to develop a coherent sentencing philosophy, and 
erroneously fostering discretionary capabilities in multiple arenas. 
Federal criminal justice post-reform suffers from prison overcapacity 
and substantially increased adjudication costs as a consequence of 
Commission decisions to increase punishments across the board and 
limit the availability of probation, while creating an extremely complex 
set of guidelines. While likely there are individuals who remain fans of 
the reform measures, negative reactive forces have been obstacles to 
achieving the reforms’ goals. Conformance measures have suffered and 
various actors in the sentencing game have found ways to circumvent 
the reforms. Notably, the federal sentencing system is the subject of 
institutional dispute and its viability is in jeopardy. 
Perhaps we have come full circle. The Department of Justice 
recently called for another round of reforms.354 Congressional 
committees are considering an overhaul.355 One can only hope that 
lessons have been learned, and that perhaps the controversies and 
 
 353 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 102, at tbl.N. 
 354 Letter from Jonathan J. Wroblewski, Dir., Off. of Pol’y & Legis., Dep’t of Justice, to Hon. 
Patti B. Saris, Chair, U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 9 (July 11, 2013), available at www.justice.gov/
criminal/foia/docs/2013annual-letter-final-071113. pdf (“The approach to reform we suggest 
is . . . . to keep focus on all the various purposes of sentencing, to understand the full costs and 
benefits of various policy options, and to recognize the benefits of a more understandable and 
simpler framework for the federal sentencing guidelines.”). 
 355 David Keene, Prison-Sentence Reform, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (May 24, 2013, 4:00 AM), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/349118/prison-sentence-reform-david-keene. 
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consequences explored in this Article may inform future reformers. 
Nonetheless, even if Congress or the Sentencing Commission does 
engage in legal and policy changes, properly heeding lessons dispensed 
by the experience with prior reforms, success is not guaranteed. The law 
of unintended consequences assures events will not transpire exactly as 
planned. A perfect sentencing system is unattainable in a complex social 
world. Improvement, though, is imaginable. 
